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Abstract of the Dissertation
Essays on the Size Distribution of Cities
by
Hiroki Watanabe
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
Washington University in St. Louis, 2015
Professor Marcus Berliant, Chair
The dissertation is comprised of three essays that analyze the spatial distribution of people
and economic activities from three distinct perspectives.
Chapter 1: Explaining the Size Distribution of Cities: X-treme Economies.12 The empir-
ical regularity known as Zipf’s law or the rank-size rule has motivated development of a
theoretical literature to explain it. We examine the assumptions on consumer behavior, par-
ticularly about their inability to insure against the city-level productivity shocks, implicitly
used in this literature. With either self insurance or insurance markets, and either an arbi-
trarily small cost of moving or the assumption that consumers do not perfectly observe the
shocks to firms’ technologies, the agents will never move. Even without these frictions, our
analysis yields another equilibrium with insurance where consumers never move. Thus, in-
surance is a substitute for movement. We propose an alternative class of models, involving
extreme risk against which consumers will not insure. Instead, they will move, generating
a Fre´chet distribution of city sizes that is empirically competitive with other models.
Chapter 2: A Scale-Free Network Structure Explains the City-Size Distribution.2 Zipf’s
law is one of the best-known empirical regularities in urban economics. There is extensive
1Forthcoming at Quantitative Economics.
2Based on joint work with Professor Marcus Berliant.
ix
research on the subject, where each city is treated symmetrically in terms of the cost of
transactions with other cities. Recent developments in network theory facilitate the exami-
nation of an asymmetric transport network. In a scale-free network, the chance of observing
extremes in network connections becomes higher than the Gaussian distribution predicts
and therefore it explains the emergence of large clusters. The city-size distribution shares
the same pattern. This paper decodes how accessibility of a city to other cities on the trans-
portation network can boost its local economy and explains the city-size distribution as a
result of its underlying transportation network structure.
Chapter 3: A Spatial Production Economy Explains Gross Metropolitan Product. It has
long been known that the city-size distribution is fat tailed, drawing the interest of urban
economists. In contrast, not much is known about the distribution of GDP at city level
(henceforth referred to as gross metropolitan product, GMP). We build a model of the spa-
tial economy that includes production and confirm the following empirical facts about the
GMP counterpart of the city-size distribution. First, both Zipf’s and Gibrat’s law hold for
the distribution of GMP as well. In particular the GMP distribution is well-traced by a
lognormal distribution. Second, citywide aggregate production exhibits increasing returns
to scale with respect to employment. In particular a 1% increase in employment leads to
a 1.117% (or 1.180% in theory) increase in GMP. Agglomeration economies are explained
as a result of an endogenous trade-off between externalities and land consumption of con-
sumers.
x
Chapter 1
Explaining the Size Distribution of Cities:
X-treme Economies
1.1 Introduction and Motivation
A small industry has developed that seeks to provide a theory to explain a singular but robust
stylized fact in urban growth: the size distribution of cities. Zipf’s law or the rank-size rule, as
applied to the size distribution of cities, states that for any country, the rank of a city according to
population (for example, New York is ranked number one in the US) multiplied by its population
is constant. Thus, Los Angeles has half the population of New York, whereas Chicago has one
third the population of New York. This stylized fact holds across many countries and time
periods (see Soo [Soo05]), but it is only one fact. In general, it is connected to Gibrat’s law, stating
that stochastic proportional growth tends to a lognormal distribution. The most compelling
empirical work in this area shows that the size distribution of cities is lognormal (Eeckhout
[Eec04]) when the data is not cut off at an arbitrary rank or population. For those unfamiliar
with the empirics associated with this literature, we display in figure 1(a) a graph of Eeckhout’s
data, consisting of more than 25,000 places from U.S. Census 2000.
Since population on the horizontal axis and rank on the vertical axis are both plotted in log
scales, the rank-size rule, taken literally, would say that the plot should be linear with slope  1.
Deviations from the rule or law at the top and bottom of the size distribution are documented
and discussed in the literature. See Gabaix and Ioannides [GI04] for a fine survey of the entire
area of research.
Further orientation with the data will prove useful so that the finer details of the distribution
might be seen. The log-log plot is rather uninformative since very different distributions can
1
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Figure 1.
appear similar because the majority of observations are bunched in the middle where there is
little variation in the log-log scale. To that end, in figure 1(b) we provide a graph of the empirical
distribution function, whereas in figure 2 we provide the density function.
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Figure 2. Empirical Density Function Data Source:
Census 2000
Explanation of the stylized fact illustrated
in these figures by a theory has long been
an objective of urban economists; it is quite
robust, but also very difficult to theorize
about. Three recent articles, Eeckhout [Eec04],
Duranton [Dur07], and Rossi-Hansberg and
Wright [RHW07], have tackled this issue head
on. The general methodology in this literature
is as follows. A city is defined as a set of firms
that receive a common technological shock to
their production functions. Generally speak-
ing, the shock is observed each period before
the agents make their decisions. Consumers are freely mobile between cities. A model of de-
2
mand and supply is formulated, generally relying on specific functional forms to obtain an
analytical solution for equilibrium prices and quantities as a function of shock realizations. The
key equation obtained from the models is the reduced form for the evolution of city population
over time. Frequently (but not universally) this equation yields stochastic proportional growth
for each city’s population, where the stochastic component is derived from the city-specific tech-
nology shock. Then Gibrat’s law is applied. The lognormal distribution matches Zipf’s law well
for the upper portion of the distribution.
The contribution of our work is as follows. First, we propose a new stochastic model of tech-
nological innovation in cities under perfect competition, giving rise in the limit to a generalized
extreme value distribution of city sizes in aggregate, where the Fisher-Tippett Theorem replaces
the central limit theorem and Gibrat’s law in a natural way. This model and its implications
are robust against the introduction of self-insurance or insurance into the framework. The other
models are generally not robust to the introduction of self-insurance or insurance, as we illustrate
formally for one example from the literature in appendix A.1. Our model is empirically compet-
itive with other models of the size distribution of cities. In particular, the error in the estimate is
very close to Eeckhout’s [Eec04] for the lognormal distribution in the data on places, but better
than Eeckhout’s [Eec04] for the MSA data.
All of these models, including ours, feature uncertainty that affects consumers through the
budget constraint only. By self-insurance, we mean that consumers have an integrated budget
constraint over time and know the distribution of future realizations of the random variables.
Thus, they can smooth consumption. Since the consumers are risk averse, insurance or self-
insurance is a substitute for migration. In the theoretical models, since moving is a discrete
choice, partial insurance is never chosen in equilibrium by an individual agent (see the last
subsection of appendix A.1).
The paper is organized as follows. First, in section 1.2, we propose a new type of model to ex-
plain the size distribution of cities, and implement it empirically. Only in section 1.3 shall we dis-
cuss in detail the related literature that attempts to refine the stylized fact, namely the rank-size
3
rule, and explain it. Then we shall raise specific objections, involving insurance or self-insurance
against city-level risk, to these models. Section 1.4 discusses our conclusions and directions for
future work. In appendix A.1 we introduce Eeckhout’s [Eec04] model and modify it to make
the objections raised in section 1.3 formal for a specific example, whereas in appendix A.2 we
examine our model with positive transport costs.
1.2 Modeling the Size Distribution of Cities
1.2.1 A Model
1.2.1.1 The Basic Model and Its Equilibrium
This model is loosely based on Duranton [Dur07], but in the context of perfect competition
instead of monopolistic competition. It can also be viewed as a slice of a larger model that would
include both our model and the model of Eaton and Kortum [EK02]. Our model adds labor and
consumer mobility, whereas their model has them locationally fixed. In contrast with the other
models in the literature, there is economy-wide risk in addition to city-level risk. But this in itself is
not sufficient to generate consumer movement. For example, if all cities faced correlated shocks at
each time, consumers could still insure against this risk by smoothing their consumption through
borrowing and saving. Thus, we employ a more extreme form of aggregate risk.
Time is discrete and all consumers are infinitely lived. Assume that there are many cities
(indexed by i = 1; :::;m) and many industries, each producing one consumption commodity (in-
dexed by j = 1; :::; n). All commodities are freely mobile. The production function for commodity
j in city i at time t is given by
yi jt = Ai jt  li jt
where yi jt is the output of commodity j in city i at time t, and li jt is labor input.1 The random
1The assumption of Starrett’s [Sta78] spatial impossibility theorem that is violated by this model is the assumption
of location-independent production sets.
4
variable Ai jt 2 R++ will be discussed in detail shortly. Suppose that each consumer supplies 1
unit of labor inelastically and that the total number of consumers as well as total labor supply is
given by N. We justify the assumption of perfect competition by implicitly assuming that there is
a large number of firms in each city capable of producing a commodity using a constant returns
technology, but all experiencing the same city-wide technology shock.
In each time period t, each city i receives a random draw for its productivity in producing
commodity j, namely Ai jt. Since we will be using the Fisher-Tippett limit theorem from extreme
value theory rather than the central limit theorem, there is no requirement that these random
variables be independent. It is assumed that with probability 1, the random draws for 2 in-
dustries at time t for city i are not both maximal among all cities for these given industries. In
equilibrium, only the cities with the highest draw of the random variable for some industry will
have employees and population. (Alternatively, we could simply classify cities exogenously by
industry, and assume that a city in an industry receives only a draw for that industry.) Exten-
sions that imply several cities produce in equilibrium will be discussed shortly, but first we must
explain the basic model.
The wage rate for the (freely mobile) population of consumers is given by w(t). In equilibrium,
it will be the same across industries.
As is standard in this literature, the utility function of a consumer at time t is given by
u(t) =
nX
j=1
1
n
c j(t)
where c j(t) is the consumption of commodity j by a consumer at time t and  2 (0; 1). Let p j(t)
be the price of commodity j at time t. Assuming that commodities are freely transportable, a
consumer’s budget constraint at time t is
nX
j=1
p j(t)  c j(t) = w(t)
5
Let (t) be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint in the consumer op-
timization problem. Standard calculations yield demand for commodity j at time t for a single
consumer d j(t):
d j(t) =
 

 (t)  n  p j(t)
! 1
1 
Aggregate demand is given by
N  d j(t) = N
 

 (t)  n  p j(t)
! 1
1 
To reduce notation, for j = 1; :::; n, define i to be the city with Ai jt = max1im, 0t0tAi jt0 .
Profit optimization yields, for each t:
p j(t)  Ai jt = w(t)
Here we are assuming total recall, in that the best technology from the past is remembered, so
new technologies are not used unless they are better than all the old ones. Also, only the best
technology in industry j survives, where the best is across all cities and previous time periods.
This assumption is made for convenience. We discuss it more below.
Hence
p j(t) =
w(t)
Ai jt
(1)
In other words, even though wage is constant across occupied cities, output price varies
inversely with the production shock. Consumption commodity market clearance requires, for
each t:
li jt  Ai jt = N  d j(t) = N
 

 (t)  n  p j(t)
! 1
1 
(2)
This is the key equation for our analysis.
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Labor market clearance requires, for each t:
nX
j=1
li jt = N (3)
Setting the constant (t) to be
(t) = N
 

 (t)  n  w(t)
! 1
1 
and using (1) and (2), we obtain
li jt 

Ai jt
 
 1 = (t)
Hence
li jt = (t) 

Ai jt
 
1  (4)
Since  < 1, labor usage li jt and the shock Ai jt are positively correlated. Notice that cities that
do not have an industry with the largest shock in that industry at time t are empty.
Existence of an equilibrium is not an issue here, since the equilibrium prices and quanti-
ties can be solved analytically. For example, at t = 1, setting p1(1) = 1, then w(1) = Ai11,
p j(1) = Ai1t=Ai jt, (1) =   nAi11
 Pn
j=1A

1 
i j1
!1 
, li j1 = N


 (1)nAi11
 1
1  A

1 
i j1 , and so forth. Thus,
equilibrium is also unique.
The original work on the asymptotic distribution of maxima drawn from a distribution is due
to Fisher and Tippett [FT28]. Modern, more general treatments are given in Coles [Col01] and
Embrechts, Kluppelberg, and Mikosch [EKM97]. We shall return to a discussion of extreme value
theory momentarily, but first we will draw the implications for our analysis.
The bottom line from this literature is that Ai jt has an asymptotic distribution of the following
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form, known as the generalized extreme value (GEV) distribution:
FGEV(x) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
exp
(
 
h
1 +  
 x 

i  1) when  , 0
exp
n
  exp
h
 
x 

io
when  = 0
Notice that there are 3 free parameters to be estimated here, namely , , and . Also notice
that to use rank as the left hand side variable in the regression, one simply computes 1 FGEV(x).
But from a pragmatic point of view, it is easier to use ln(FGEV(x)) as the left hand side variable.
If there are no upper or lower bounds on the distribution, then  = 0 and the distribution is
Gumbel. If there is an upper bound on the distribution, then  < 0 and the distribution is reverse
Weibull. If there is a lower bound on the distribution, for example 0 in our case, then  > 0 and
the distribution is Fre´chet.
Substituting (4),
ln(F(l)) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
 
"
1 +  
 
l
(t)
 1 
   
!
=
#
when  , 0
  exp
"
 
 
l
(t)
 1 
   
!
=
#
when  = 0
(5)
Notice that if we use cross section data, then t and hence (t) is constant. Thus, in addition to the
3 standard parameters for the GEV distribution of Ai jt (namely ,  and ), for the distribution
of li jt there are two additional parameters, namely  and , that arise from our economic model.
Now that the basic model is fully developed, we can discuss why, unlike other models in this
literature, consumers will not want to insure against this risk. Instead, they will move. If only a
small percentage of cities produce at any time, then insurance would cost only slightly less than
the wage, so the consumers might as well move and receive the wage in each period. For example,
to keep things simple suppose that there are 100 industries (or consumption commodities) and
100 cities in each industry (that is, each city is capable of producing only one commodity). Then
there is only one city producing in each industry at each given time, and 100 cities out of 10,000
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producing in each given time. As time plays out, as long as some consumers are willing to move,
each of the cities producing at a given time will eventually be replaced by another in the industry.
The city using old technology has zero wage and no production. So if some workers don’t move,
their average wage tends to one percent of the expected new wage with time. Under symmetry
of cities in an industry, actuarially fair insurance would cost 99% of the expected new wage. In
other words, if workers move they will receive the wage next period, but if they insure they will
receive 1% of the wage next period. The only way workers won’t move is if they all agree to use
old, frozen technology in each industry, and collude so that none will move for a higher wage.
In contrast, we assume competitive behavior.
This is the main idea motivating our specific model. Next, we discuss extensions and the
intuition behind why this idea is robust.
1.2.1.2 Extensions of the Basic Model and Further Implications
In fact, what we have presented is an extreme example. All that is needed to induce consumers
to reject insurance and move is that the probability of unemployment next period is greater than
zero if they don’t move. To obtain stronger results, for example the GEV distribution, stronger
assumptions are required. Thus, there are many models like this in which consumers will not
take up insurance, but that do not require such strong assumptions. We provide a simple one
that is tractable.
We claim that the choice of insurance or moving is essentially a bang-bang phenomenon, not
only in this model but in other models of stochastic growth belonging to the literature that will
be surveyed in section 1.3. That is, generically one or the other will be better for consumers, so
in equilibrium they will not coexist. Moreover, in equilibrium there will be no partial insurance.
To see this, notice first that utilities are not state-dependent, so the state only directly affects
budget constraints. Second, the decision to move is a discrete one: Either all of a moving cost
or none of it is incurred by a particular consumer. If competition forces insurance to be priced
competitively, implying both that consumer cost is proportional to price and that it is actuarially
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fair, then risk averse consumers will always want to fully insure or move, facing no uncertainty in
equilibrium. The consumers must consider whether the moving cost or the cost of full insurance
is cheaper. Generically these exogenous parameters are unequal, so only one or the other will be
observed in equilibrium. Partial insurance will not result unless there is some defect in insurance
markets; but the random shock in this entire class of models is assumed to be observed by
all agents. Generically, none would predict that consumers use partial insurance. We prove this
more formally in the appendix A.1 in the case where moving is costly and insurance is actuarially
fair.
Given the structure of the model and the others in the literature, it is much more natural to
introduce a market imperfection in the labor market: labor heterogeneity and adverse selection,
moral hazard, or search frictions, for example. This new source of uncertainty or asymmetric
information requires an additional dimension for states of nature beyond the states we have
specified for production shocks. It leads to a different form of a distortion or market imperfection
than the one in this literature, since for example labor supply might be distorted. Although
individual labor supply is inelastic in our basic model, it is elastic for example in Eeckhout
[Eec04]; see appendix A.1 below. Elastic labor supply could easily be put into our model in an
additively separable way at the cost of further notation. The consequences of a distortion in the
labor market would be very different from the introduction of an exogenous mobility cost that
varies between zero and infinity, as described in the previous paragraph. Full or partial insurance
would have to be defined over states of the world associated with a new source of uncertainty
or asymmetric information related to the labor market, in contrast with the one already in the
model that is related to production shocks.
Returning to our basic model, the consumers still might want to insure against aggregate
wage volatility (namely movement in w(t) over time) by saving and borrowing to smooth con-
sumption, but their spatial distribution is still as we have laid out.
Returning now to our assumptions and extreme value theory, the original theory of Fisher
and Tippett presumed that, fixing j, the random variables, Ai jt in our case, were i.i.d. across i
10
and t. Of course, in our context this makes little sense. In general, the city with the best technology
for some good j at a particular time t is more likely to innovate and produce a better technology for the
next period than an arbitrary city. Moreover, it is possible that cities nearby are more likely to
innovate than an arbitrary city. Fortunately, much progress has been made in extreme value the-
ory since 1928. The modern versions of the Fisher-Tippett theorem, as given by Coles ([Col01],
Theorem 5.1) and Embrechts, Kluppelberg, and Mikosch ([EKM97], Theorem 4.4.1) allow some
dependence. Specifically, what is required is that the sequence of random variables be station-
ary and that a form of asymptotic independence (as blocks of random variables become farther
apart in time) hold.2 Since temporal (as well as spatial) correlation is allowed, the model can explain the
persistence of an industry in a given city over time. For example, the assumption that the process is
stationary imposes some symmetry on the spatial correlation, in that the influence of neighbors
on the productivity of one reference location is the same, independent of the reference location.
However, we note that even the modern versions of the Fisher-Tippett theorem we have cited give
only sufficient conditions for convergence to the GEV distribution. There are yet further general-
izations to non-stationary processes; see Coles ([Col01], chapter 6) for example. So asymmetries
in space, implying that the process is not stationary, can still lead to the GEV distribution.
Returning to the case of i.i.d. technology draws, an implication of extreme value theory (Em-
brechts, Kluppelberg, and Mikosch ([EKM97], chapter 5.4)) is that the time between new record
draws of technology in an industry grow in a roughly exponential fashion with the passage
of time. This implication of the theory might not hold in more general settings, for example
non-stationary ones.
It is also important to note that the model and results can be extended to the case where more
than one city in an industry produces. This could happen, for example, if there is transportation
cost for consumption goods between cities, so a city with a high realization of productivity for
a commodity, but not the highest, might serve a local market. It turns out that extreme value
theory applies not only to the maximum of a sequence of random variables, but also to the upper
2An easy way to fit our structure into the theory is to fix an industry j and imagine that at each time t, there are m
subperiods. A city i draws its random variable Ai jt in subperiod i of time t.
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order statistics. A detailed discussion of the results can be found in Embrechts, Kluppelberg, and
Mikosch ([EKM97], Section 4.2). These extensions of the model require a simulation approach,
as the analytics are difficult. Specifically, the calculation of aggregate demand on the right hand
side of equation (2) becomes difficult due to the endogeneity of market area. Our simulations
appear in appendix A.2 below.
A couple more remarks are in order. First, the role of having different industries j, as in the
other models in the literature, is to generate a full distribution of limiting populations rather than
just one realization of the asymptotic distribution of city populations. Second, in contrast with
other models in the literature, the cities without the best technology for some industry at a given
time have zero population, so they don’t show up in the data because they are rural.
1.2.1.3 Stochastic Proportional Growth
As a complement to our basic analysis of the model, it is interesting to see under what conditions
our model will generate stochastic proportional growth in (occupied) city populations. To exam-
ine this, we must specialize and reinterpret slightly the stochastic part of our model, inspired by
Eeckhout ([Eec04], p. 1447). Suppose that a primitive productivity random variable is generated
by the AR(1) process:
Bi jt = k  Bi j(t 1) + 1     "i j(t 1) (6)
where "i j(t 1) is i.i.d. with mean 0 and finite variance, and where 0 < k < 1. For the purpose of
approximation, we will be taking k close to 1. Then define the reduced form random variable Ai jt
by:
Ai jt  exp(Bi jt)
Our previous analysis applies to this more specific model of Ai jt, for instance the aforementioned
Theorem 4.4.1 of Embrechts, Kluppelberg, and Mikosch [EKM97], along with all of the results in
the subsections above. But with this additional structure, we can say more.
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Consistent with our notation:
For j = 1; :::; n, let i be such that Bi jt = max
1im, 0t0t
Bi jt0
If the "i jt are small, we claim that
Bi jt  k  Bi j(t 1) + 1     "i j(t 1)
in the sense that the distributions of the two sides of this expression viewed at time t 1 are close.
The reasoning behind this approximation is as follows. Fix industry j. If Bi j(t 1)  k  Bi0 j(t 1) for
all 1  i  m, 0  t0  t  1, i0 , i, then the city with the maximal draw remains the same between
periods t 1 and t, so the approximation holds according to equation (6). If Bi j(t 1)  k Bi0 j(t 1) for
some 1  i0  m, 0  t0  t   1, i0 , i, then the distribution of k  Bi j(t 1) + 1   "i j(t 1) conditional
on Bi j(t 1) is close to the distribution of k  Bi0 j(t 1) + 1   "i0 j(t 1) conditional on Bi0 j(t 1), so the
approximation holds.
Dividing equation (4) at time t by its value at time t   1 to the power k,
li jt
[li j(t 1)]k
=
(t)
[(t   1)]k 
 
Ai jt
[Ai j(t 1)]k
! 
1 
for each industry j = 1; :::; n (7)
Using (4) and (3),
N =
nX
j=1
li jt
= (t) 
nX
j=1
(Ai jt)

1 
Now
lim
n!1
Pn
j=1(Ai jt)

1 
n
= E[(Ai jt)

1  ]
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Hence for k close to 1,
(t)
[(t   1)]k 
E[(Ai j(t 1))

1  ]
E[(Ai jt)

1  ]
 1
Taking logarithms of both sides of equation (7):
ln(li jt) = k  ln(li j(t 1)) + 1    
1   

 "i j(t 1)
= k  ln(li j(t 1)) + "i j(t 1)
 ln(li j(t 1)) + "i j(t 1)
This last equation is the form of stochastic proportional city population growth obtained in
Eeckhout [Eec04].
The assumption that k < 1 is essential, in the sense that k = 1 yields Gibrat’s law and a lognor-
mal distribution for occupied cities. The assumption k < 1 implies the asymptotic independence
used for modern variants of the Fisher-Tippett theorem. In contrast, k = 1 implies some perma-
nent path dependence. Another way of framing the arguments in this subsection is that the order
of limits in k and t matters.
1.2.2 Empirical Implementation
Notice that we are not overly concerned with identification of the 5 parameters in equation (5). In
essence, the parameters are identified by the functional form itself. The economic interpretation
of these variables is as follows. The three parameters of the GEV distribution, , , and , are
analogous to the mean and variance of the lognormal distribution estimated by Eeckhout, or
the regression coefficients estimated for Zipf’s law using a log-log regression. They have no
direct economic interpretation. Since  and  are derived from the model, they do have an
economic interpretation. Standard calculations tell us that 11  is the elasticity of substitution
for consumers between consumption commodities. The endogenous variable  is more difficult
to interpret, since it involves a number of endogenous variables as well as random variables.
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But equation (4) gives us the equilibrium relationship between the random variable representing
productivity in an industry (exogenous) and employment in that industry (endogenous). So (t)
tells us equilibrium employment in an industry where one unit of labor produces one unit of
consumption commodity.
We use the Census 2000 data set also used by Eeckhout. Table 1 gives the summary statistics
for this data along with the MSA-level data that we use later for comparison.3
Unit Sample Size Mean Variance Median Mode Max Min
Place 25,358 8.232E+03 4.677E+09 1,338 86 8,008,278 1
MSA 922 2.837E+05 9.490E+11 71,800.5 20,411 18,323,002 13,004
Table 1. Summary Statistics for US data
As noted in the sources we cite for extreme value theory, the most common method of es-
timating extreme value distributions is to use maximum likelihood. The maximum likelihood
estimator (MLE) does not yield the smallest Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) statistic in our data set.
The KS statistic measures the maximum distance between a sample distribution and its estimate.
As noted by Goldstein, Morris, and Yen [GMY04] in the context of social networks and later by
Eeckhout (2009) in the context of the size distribution of cities, using a simple log-log regression
can lead to serious statistical problems. The use of MLE and the KS statistic is preferred. It is
interesting to note that both the literature on estimation of the GEV distribution and the litera-
ture on Zipf’s law seem to be (independently) converging on MLE as the preferred method of
estimation.
For purposes of comparison with Eeckhout [Eec04], we produce estimates using each of the
lognormal (his) distribution and the generalized extreme value (our) distribution using equa-
tion (5), for both maximum likelihood estimation and minimization of the KS statistic (MinKS).
We also report an estimate using the double Pareto lognormal distribution (DPL) from Giesen,
Zimmermann, and Suedekum [GZS10] for comparison. Table 2 below summarizes the estima-
3For a definition of the spatial units used by the Census, see for example http://www.genesys-sampling.com/
pages/Template2/site2/61/default.aspx
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tion results. The results of maximum likelihood estimation for the lognormal distribution are
identical to Eeckhout’s. The rightmost columns contain the KS statistic, the log likelihood of
the estimates (LogLH), the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), and the Bayesian Information
Criterion (BIC).
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In the interest of full disclosure, we report both the MLE and MinKS estimates in table 2.
Notice that the MLE estimate implies a reverse Weibull distribution whereas MinKS estimates
imply a Fre´chet distribution. Since city sizes do not fall below zero, we expect the distribution
to follow a Fre´chet distribution. MLE predicts otherwise due to the large, uncensored data set
containing places. The estimated Fre´chet distribution under MinKS implies that the smallest
place will have population 1:582, and two places actually fall below this size. Indeed, once we
truncate the data to MSA’s, MLE predicts a Fre´chet distribution. So the reverse Weibull GEV
distribution is driven by extremely small populations in the sample of places.
Of course, the comparison between lognormal and GEV is not quite fair. In general, the more
parameters a distribution has, the better its fit to data. There are only two parameters in the
lognormal distribution whereas there are five parameters in our distribution, and these param-
eters do not contain the parameters used for the lognormal distribution. In Table 2, we report
the Akaike and Bayesian information criteria, that penalize distributions with more parameters.
Smaller values for these criteria mean better performance. Those two statistics indicate that the
lognormal and our distribution are still comparable when an adjustment for the number of pa-
rameters is made. In particular for the uncensored place data, after penalizing each estimate for
the number of parameters used, where the penalty is larger for the GEV estimate, the error is quite
similar, with GEV slightly ahead. The penalties are actually quite small relative to the log like-
lihood, since the data sets are so large. There is more divergence between lognormal and GEV
in the error for the MSA estimates. Clearly, as Eeckhout (2004) points out, there are problems
with truncation of this data. On the other hand, it seems quite odd to give places with just a
few people in them the same weight as, say, New York City in the data. Implicitly in the place
data, all places have weight 1. In the MSA data, places above a certain population have weight 1,
whereas all other weights are set to 0. There is likely a way to weight the data better than these
extreme cases, but we do not attempt a formal theory of data weighting for these estimates.4 So
4As Eeckhout ([Eec04], pp. 1434-1436) points out, the theoretical definition of a city as those firms that experience
a common shock (perhaps assuming spatial independence of shocks) should drive the empirical unit used. In places
with only a few inhabitants, it is difficult to see how to apply this definition. On the empirical side, Eeckhout (2004,
Figure 7) finds some anamolies at the low end of the distribution. In our opinion, random models of city growth
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we do not completely discount the MSA estimates (as Eeckhout might), but rather await a less
extreme data weighting scheme than the two standard ones. The truth probably lies somewhere
in between. This appears to be an interesting topic for future research.
Graphically (in color), the estimates and data plots follow in figure 3.
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(a) MLE of lognormal distribution
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(b) MLE of GEV distribution
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(c) MinKS estimation of GEV distribution
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Figure 3.
In summary, estimates using the generalized extreme value distribution are quite competitive.
We ran simulations of our model with positive transportation cost. The results and discussion
can be found in appendix A.2. Related to this, Hsu, Mori, and Smith [WTTT14] study a random
might not be appropriate for small places.
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growth model of the city size distribution when city connections matter.
1.3 Relationship to the Literature
1.3.1 The Older Literature
The innovative work of Gabaix [Gab99a, Gab99b] is the source from which the modern litera-
ture on the size distribution of cities flows. This work uses an overlapping generations structure
where consumers live for two periods. It is assumed that moving costs are so high that con-
sumers can only choose their location (city) when they are young. This location decision is made
after shocks to production and amenities are realized for that period, and known to all. The
consumer/workers cannot move again when old. The wages or income for the old in a city are
never even specified, and it is simply assumed that the young make their decisions in a myopic
manner. Moreover, the availability of insurance or capital markets is never discussed, so it is
unknown whether the young can hedge against uncertainty about their wage when they are old
in the city they choose.
If the old people are immobile, why is this important? It is important because when the
young make their decisions, they can anticipate what happens when they are old, and might
change their minds about their location decisions when young. In other words, they won’t
behave myopically. Without myopia, insurance becomes important.
1.3.2 Recent Literature
Chief among recent work are Rossi-Hansberg and Wright [RHW07], Duranton [Dur06], Eeckhout
[Eec04] and Duranton [Dur07]. We focus on the latter two.
Eeckhout’s model has consumers who are infinitely lived with foresight and who can move
each period. There are technological shocks to production in each city in each time period. It
is movement of the consumer/worker population in response to these shocks that generates
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Gibrat’s law. The shocks generate changes in equilibrium wages, rents, and congestion across
time and space that correspond to the consumer movements that equalize utility levels across
space at each time. On p. 1445, the following statement is made: “Moreover, because there is
no aggregate uncertainty over different locations, and because capital markets are perfect, the
location decision in each period depends only on the current period utility. The problem is
therefore a static problem of maximizing current utility for a given population distribution, and
the population distribution must be such that in all cities, the population Si;t equates utilities
across cities.”
Here we wish to make an important distinction between transfers of consumption across time,
namely perfect capital markets, and across states, namely complete and perfect futures markets.
The actual consumer optimization problem in Eeckhout’s model does not involve state-
dependent assets nor does it allow state-contingent transfers of income. If it were to allow this,
as in a standard model of complete futures or insurance markets, then agents would never move.
They would simply buy assets at the start of time that would pay them under a bad state in their
city at a particular time, and such that they would pay under a good realization in their city. In
other words, they would insure against the state of nature in their city. It is important to rec-
ognize that in this model there are two factors determining a worker/consumer’s productivity,
namely the city-specific shock, and the externality in production induced by total population in
the city.
The basic model of Duranton [Dur07] has consumers maximizing an intertemporal utility
function subject to an intertemporal budget constraint, without facing uncertainty. However,
once the detailed urban features are added (in Section V and Duranton [Dur06]), the model
looks similar to Eeckhout’s at least in terms of the urban features. One simply needs some
dependence of local prices (land rents or wages) on the state of nature. Then utility equalization
implies that people will move depending on the state realization, but this movement disappears
if one allows insurance.
There isn’t enough detail about the urban market in Duranton [Dur06, Dur07] to make specific
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statements about how insurance would work, but the consumers in a city face uncertainty about
employment due to the uncertainty about innovations in various industries, so similar insurance
arguments should work if the details of the model are filled in.
Regarding contemporary developments in this literature, Behrens, Duranton, and Robert-
Nicoud [BDRN+10] is a very interesting contribution that does not employ Gibrat’s law to obtain
Zipf’s law. Using a static model, a number of stylized facts are matched. There is an asymmetric
information/adverse selection component as well as a potentially insurable luck component in
the model.
In general, we are inquiring whether moving or buying insurance is cheaper for the con-
sumers in these models. Typically in these models if moving costs are positive, it makes sense
for consumers to stay put and insure.
1.3.3 Criticism of the Literature
1.3.3.1 How Insurance Reduces Population Movement
So how might this insurance occur in practice? Let’s assume either that consumers cannot
perfectly observe the technology shocks to cities, or moving has a small cost, or both.
 Self insurance. Since consumers can transfer consumption across time, and they know that
shocks are i.i.d., then they can borrow or use their savings in bad times and save (or pay off
their loans) in good, staying in the same city. In the literature, the intertemporal uncertainty
faced by consumers does not show up in their objective function, whereas the possibility of
self-insurance does not show up in the budget constraint. The earlier quote from Eeckhout
seems to imply that this is allowed, but the formal statement of the consumer budget
constraint makes it clear that this is not allowed. This type of insurance exploits the fact
that for any given city, the shocks are i.i.d. over time. Empirically, the place to look for
self-insurance is in the savings response to local employment shocks.
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 Insurance markets. In all of these models, at each time the state of nature (the random shock
to each production function for each city) is known to all and verifiable5 before consumers
make their decisions about consumption bundles and location. So this is a perfect setting
for a viable insurance market. An insurance firm can step in or the continuum of consumers
can simply pool resources in each period, smoothing their consumption without changing
location so it is independent of the state in their city. This type of insurance exploits the
fact that at any given time, the shocks are i.i.d. across cities. Empirically, one place to
look for insurance is a cross-country comparison of how varying benefits of unemployment
insurance affect mobility in response to local employment shocks.
 Futures markets. Consumers formulate plans to sell labor and buy consumption com-
modity and housing contingent on every possible state in every time period. There is no
empirical complement. We mention this for completeness.
Given that for Gibrat’s law to hold, the shocks to each city in each period must be “small”(see
Eeckhout ([Eec04], p. 1447), it seems reasonable to think that insurance would yield higher con-
sumer utility than movement, if moving costs are at all significant or if consumers cannot observe
shocks to firms perfectly, and thus face even a small amount of uncertainty in their optimization
problems.
For models in the literature, consumers will choose to insure instead of move when insurance
is available. A common feature of both the models in the literature and the model we have
presented is the prediction that people will move and not insure. A major difference between
our model and the balance of the literature is clear: An advantage of our model is that it can
explain endogenously the lack of insurance, whereas the other models in the literature implicitly
assume that such markets, namely insurance or self-insurance (saving and borrowing), do not
exist. The empirical investigation of the use of insurance as a substitute for migration, especially
when consumer heterogeneity is taken into account, seems quite interesting as a topic for future
5Thus, such models differ from models of human capital, for example, where verification is not a realistic assump-
tion and thus insurance against fluctuations is not to be expected.
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research.
But as a preview, we present preliminary work. We compare US data with analogous data for
Belgium and Germany. For Germany and Belgium, we use data on municipalities, whereas for
the US we use data on MSA’s. Please note that all of this data is therefore truncated. For Europe,
we use the data from Soo [Soo05], who obtains it from http://www.citypopulation.de/. We
provide summary statistics for all three data sets in table 3.
Country Germany Belgium US
Year 1998 2000 2000
Mean 152684.8 62959.74 156903.7
Standard Error 19194.33 7372.42 15141.98
Median 77486 39261 80537
Standard Deviation 286632.5 61239.92 391062
Sample Variance 8.22E+10 3.75E+09 1.53E+11
Minimum 20425 24791 50052
Maximum 3425759 446525 8008278
Count 223 69 667
Table 3. City Population Summary Statistics for Germany, Belgium, and the US
We present in table 3 the estimates of the models for Germany and Belgium, to be used in
conjunction with table 2 for the MSA estimates for the US. We note that for MLE, there is no
general analog of t-statistics for each parameter estimate, just an overall measure of goodness
of fit such as the KS statistic. The sample sizes are very different in table 2, resulting in very
different log likelihoods as well as AIC and BIC statistics.
Likely insurance mechanisms are more developed and moving costs are higher for Europe
compared with the US. Thus, one would expect deviations from Zipf’s law and lognormal mod-
els, but not from GEV, for Europe as compared to the US. We examine AIC and BIC ratios of
lognormal to GEV for each country in table 4. What we find is that in 3 of the 4 cases, the GEV
fit is better for Europe as opposed to the US.
For a more complete analysis, it would be desirable to regress the ratios in table 4 on proxies
for moving cost and insurance mechanisms in each country for a larger sample of countries. That
would give us a reading on which model performs better, but is beyond the scope of this paper.
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Germany Belgium US
AIC Lognormal/GEV 1.026 1.021 1.0101
BIC Lognormal/GEV 1.024 .983 1.0096
Table 4. Comparison of European and US Results
1.3.3.2 Possible Objections to the Criticism
We emphasize that the criticism we make is a purely theoretical point concerning models in the literature.
Whether or not agents in the real world actually insure or self insure against city-wide risk is
not relevant to the question at hand. Our point is that in the theoretical worlds of these models,
insurance or self-insurance of the sort discussed in the previous subsection is implicitly excluded.
The reasons are not given or, more importantly, included in the model. If these factors, such as
asymmetric information, are included in the model to explain insurance market breakdown,
other competing forces driving agglomeration can be important; see for example Berliant and
Kung (2010), where it is shown that adverse selection alone can generate agglomeration. In other
words, this criticism of the internal structure of the models, for example when there is a non-zero
moving cost, is that the consumers are not behaving rationally if they don’t insure or self insure.
Next we present a discussion of why insurance market breakdown is not natural in the context
of the models. Again, this is not meant to be a statement about the real world, but rather about
whether the exclusion of an insurance option for consumers in the models makes sense.
The usual cause of a breakdown of insurance markets is adverse selection, represented for
example by cream-skimming on the part of insurance companies. In the models discussed here,
the state is assumed realized and observable to all before decisions are made in a given time
period. So there is no issue of adverse selection. But one can easily imagine variations of these
models that incorporate some form of information asymmetry. It would not be natural for,
say, only consumers to know the shock to the local economy, since the technology shock really
affects firms. If only firms knew the realization of the shock before making their decisions,
then consumers could draw inferences from firm behavior, or the consumers could self insure
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or insure. It is not clear what hidden information or hidden action on the part of consumers
would cause an insurance market breakdown in this context, given that the shock is to firms’
technologies. It is natural to assume that amenities are observable.
One can imagine moral hazard at the city level with insurance markets, in that a city might try
to claim a productivity level lower than the actual one so the residents can collect more insurance
money. However, there are no local governments in the models in the literature to coordinate
this, and the assumption is that local productivity is observable to all, including non-residents of
the city, when they make their location decisions.
Another objection that could be raised is the commitment required on the part of consumers.
In fact, commitment to a plan or contract is a requirement of models that feature self-insurance,
insurance or futures markets generally. For example, a consumer might experience regret over the
purchase of a long-term health insurance contract after the state of the world that tells them that
they are healthy is realized. Or the insurance company might experience regret if the consumer
turns out to be unhealthy. But they are committed to their contracts. In the models of the
size distribution of cities, for example, one could begin the random process of technological
change and at any point in time, allow insurance and commitment to begin. Then the population
distribution will not change from that point on.
Self insurance through borrowing and saving requires a long term commitment to a plan.
Insurance cooperatives or firms only require a one period commitment to stay in a city and
work. The latter commitment problem can be solved with the following time line, a standard
time line for insurance in the real world. First, people are in a city from last period. They
make an insurance premium payment to the insurance company equal to the maximum possible
income for a shock this period less the income workers received from work last period in the
city. This will be “small” since the random shock is small, as explained in detail in appendix A.1.
Then they work and the shock for this period is realized (timing here is not important). Then
any insurance payment is made from the pool to obtain the average income. After that, the next
period begins.
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This way, people cannot receive income and then move without sacrificing their insurance.
Since in all equilibria the utility levels in every city in Eeckhout’s model are the same, they must
lose utility by moving and giving up insurance (the loss is their premium). Of course, one could
then say that the insurance company could abscond with the money. But this stretches credulity.
One might easily object to even small moving costs or even a small amount of noise in con-
sumer observations of shocks. Then what we present is another equilibrium, that yields exactly
the same period by period utility as the equilibrium studied in this literature. This alternative
equilibrium retains the initial distribution of consumers, and does not generate Zipf’s law.
Finally, there are costs associated with insurance contracts that, from the point of view of
consumers, must be balanced against the cost of moving. Such costs involve lawyers and poten-
tially complex transactions. Moreover, unemployment insurance might fulfill the role of explicit
contracts. Self insurance does not suffer from these problems. But credit constraints could limit
self-insurance. In any case, insurance does not need to be perfect. If there is substitution be-
tween insurance and mobility, the type of mobility needed to generate the various empirical
distributions of city size can be upset.
But we emphasize again that although these various insurance market imperfections can
cause insurance market breakdown, their inclusion in a formal model is necessary to ensure that
consumers behave rationally when they don’t insure, and the consequences of their inclusion are
far from obvious.
An alternative to insurance markets is self-insurance. Even if insurance markets are excluded
from a model by assumption, for example because they are not observed in the real world, self-
insurance must also be excluded and this exclusion justified.
In appendix A.1, we modify a model from the literature, Eeckhout [Eec04], to include insur-
ance (as well as moving cost) and to prove our claims formally. This represents an example. We
conjecture that the other models in the literature can be modified in a similar fashion.
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1.4 Conclusions
We are making several related points:
 First, when a model, markedly different from those found previously in the literature,
is constructed to explain a specific empirical phenomenon, the microeconomic, structural
assumptions about individual behavior and markets must make sense. Here, there is a
rather obvious problem that self-insurance and insurance markets are assumed not to be
functional. Models in the literature feature city-level risk, and it is generally possible to
insure against such risk through many vehicles, barring asymmetric information. The latter
does not arise naturally in these models, since consumers are assumed to know the state of
nature before making their location and consumption decisions.
 With time in the model, it is even possible to insure against aggregate risk through borrow-
ing and saving.
 However, it is much more difficult to insure against extreme aggregate risk, so we propose
such a model. Our model begins with microfoundations and delivers a different functional
form for the size distribution of cities than has been used in the literature.
In summary, we first propose a model based on primitive assumptions, not designed to match
any particular stylized fact (like the rank size rule), but rather capturing the following theoretical
notion: Insurance is allowed, but consumers will never use it, as it is very costly. Instead, they
move. The new model is based on extreme value theory and yields a functional form for the
size distribution of cities different from the other models, and this prediction is empirically
competitive with the ones in the literature. Then we advance a criticism of the literature based
on the fact that a primitive assumption in previous work, that consumers cannot insure (either
by borrowing and saving or by pooling resources) against the random productivity variable
for each city that is observable to all. If insurance is allowed, there is another equilibrium of the
model retaining the initial distribution of consumers where there is never any migration. Instead,
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consumers insure against the risk, and the utility stream they obtain in this manner is the same as
that in the equilibrium used in the literature. If there is any moving cost or residual uncertainty,
the equilibrium used in the literature disappears.
Is insurance or self-insurance an important issue for the analysis of the size distribution of
cities and city growth? The presence of insurance has no effect on our model, since it will
never be taken up, and is simply prohibited in the other models in the literature. Thus, direct
evidence regarding insurance or self-insurance is insufficient to distinguish between the models
empirically. From the theoretical viewpoint, it makes no difference whether or not insurance is
prohibited in our model, as the equilibrium is unchanged. But it makes a huge difference whether
insurance is prohibited in other models, as the equilibrium with insurance and the equilibrium
without insurance are vastly different. Other models from the literature that are modified to
include insurance will not generate Zipf’s law or Gibrat’s law. It is in this sense that abstraction
from consideration of insurance or self-insurance by other models in the literature is a first-order
issue.
Future work includes testing further predictions of the model, for example the wage and rent
distributions when transport costs for consumption commodities are introduced, and applying
the model in new (but appropriate) contexts, such as finance (see Gabaix et al. (2003) for an
application of Gibrat’s law to finance) or crop abundance (see Halloy (1999) for an application of
the lognormal distribution to crop abundance).
Application to the size distribution of firms is of interest; see, for example, Axtell (2001) in
the context of Zipf’s law or Gabaix (2011) more generally. Frequent churning might be expected
more in firms than in cities. There are two issues with this idea. First, in an aspatial model,
moving between firms is easy for workers, so our insurance critique will not apply to models
using the lognormal or Pareto distributions, which therefore might be more appropriate. Second,
we are using a competitive model since there is a continuum of firms in each city producing the
same commodity and subject to the same productivity shock. The competitive assumption might
not make as much sense in an aspatial model where productivity shocks are firm-specific, so
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only one firm has the state of the art production technology.
Finally, an interesting direction for future research is to merge our model with that of Eaton
and Kortum (2002). Such a model would be very complicated. As an alternative to this approach,
adding an iceberg transportation cost to our model, as we have done in simulations, seems more
worthwhile.
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Chapter 2
A Scale-Free Transportation Network Explains
City-Size Distribution
2.1 Introduction
Cities develop in relation to other cities rather than in a vacuum. What we consume in a city
differs from what we produce in a city. The gap between the range and scale of production and
consumption at city level is bridged by the transportation network, over which cities trade their
products with others. The transportation network, in turn, does not coordinate cities uniformly.
Some cities have only limited connections while others receive many links from cities across the
country, both large and small, near and far away. The fate of city’s economy, and by extension its
population size, is more or less conditioned by how it is positioned (inadvertently or otherwise)
in the overall interurban network of cities and how accessible it is from others. We will show that
the city-size distribution is the result of a particular class of network that our economy installs
on itself for interurban trading purposes, namely, a scale-free network.
The existing literature’s treatment of the transportation network has been rather naı¨ve and
simplistic. Most existing models of city-size distribution implicitly or explicitly assume a com-
pletely isolated graph (figure 4(a)) or complete graph (figure 5(a)). Each node represents a city
and a link represents a route available for shipment. The number inside a node counts its degree,
i.e., the number of edges or routes each node has. Commodities cannot be shipped at all on
a completely isolated graph, but they can be shipped anywhere in a single step from any city
on a complete graph. Either way, the resulting equilibrium will be an even split of population
among the cities, which does not match the actual city-size distribution. To explain the city-size
distribution, we have sought a source of variation other than what the nexus of interurban rela-
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(a) The United States according to completely isolated graph with
the 50 largest cities.
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Figure 4. Completely isolated graph
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(b) Complete graph with 50 nodes.
Figure 5. Complete graph
tionships has to offer. Some use a completely isolated graph (e.g., Eeckhout [Eec04]). Others such
as Duranton [Dur06], Rossi-Hansburg and Wright [RHW07] or the New Economic Geography
[FKV99] engage a complete graph as the transport structure, when in fact, transaction and/or
communication between hub cities is much easier than between cities on peripheries. Behrens
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et al [BMMS13] introduce a more lifelike representation of transportation cost in that the deliv-
ered price depends on a particular city pair. The price differential reflects monopolistic pricing
rather than the underlying transportation network structure, which is still an (ex-ante) complete
graph. The literature usually introduces a tiebreaker in the form of externalities, random growth,
economies of scale or scope to replicate the actual city-size distribution.
In practice, transportation cost differs greatly depending on where you are and where you are
headed. We will drop the assumption that our economy operates on a complete or completely
isolated graph and see how much explanatory power network structure exerts as the engine of
local economies of various sizes.
The transaction pattern between any two cities affects both the way cities are populated and
the overall city-size distribution. Cities are tied together in various ways both topologically
and economically. Some cities function as an intersection of major transportation routes and
they trade and process commodities frequently in large volume. Others are less active in the
interurban exchange of commodities. Differences among cities in terms of exchange patterns
reverberate in the city-size distribution. Cities heavily interrelated to many others are likely to
grow due to increased economic activities, whereas cities with sparse connections to a limited
number of cities are liable to remain small in size. Those small cities, however, will not be
completely wiped off the map.
2.1.1 Cities on a Network
Intercity exchange patterns like figures 4(a) and 5(a) are best described by a network with cities
as a set of vertices and traffic by edges as in figures 4(b) and 5(b). In this regard, network theory
is indispensable when constructing a model of cities in the nationwide economy.
The recent seminal work by Baraba´si and Albert [BA99] has revitalized network theory. Clas-
sical network theory pioneered by Erdo˝s and Re´nyi [ER59]’s model (ER network) cannot explain
the emergence of a cluster or hub in a network, which we observe in most real social networks. In
a classic random graph, each node is linked with an equal probability to any other and lacks dis-
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tinctiveness, for the number of pre-existing links does not matter in forming a network. Baraba´si
and Albert (BA) add a dynamic feature and preferential attachment to the classical random
graph model so that the nodes are no longer ex-ante identical. Some nodes gather lots of links
while others are wired to just a few. The model has been applied to many fields, including the
emergence of web science, and has produced an improved description of the organization and
development of networks. Most real-world networks have one thing in common: the resulting
distributions of links are scale-invariant, that is, the distributions have fat tails. We can find
nodes with an extremely large number of links rather easily with these networks compared to a
classical random graph.
The city-size distribution shares the same pattern of scale invariance: the distribution of the
100 largest cities follows the same distribution as the one for the 1000 largest cities and so on, a
property known as a power law, and in particular, Zipf’s law in the city-size literature. We expect
that the degree of a city is positively related to its population. And for that reason, we imagine
that our economy is based on a BA network rather than an ER network. This turns out to be
correct, but selection of the appropriate network structure depends on exactly how node degree
is related to city size. We will decode their relationship in section 2.3.8.
The urban economic application of network theory is in its very early stage of development
and there is much room for advancement. Interaction between individual cities has not caught
much attention so far. Our goal in this paper is to bring to the fore the interaction between
transportation network structure and the city-size distribution. With this goal in mind we intro-
duce (asymptotic) techniques from network theory and merge them with a tractable economic
model in a new way. We do not intend this work to be the last word on this topic, but merely a
suggestion of a first step into a bigger research program.
2.1.2 Some Transportation Networks Are Scale Free
Our economy operates on various modes of transportation and each mode comes with distinct
network structures. Take a highway and airline network for example. Figures 6(a) and 7(a) are
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schematic representations of the Interstate System and a typical airline route map for the 50
largest US cities. Apparently, a network composed of the Interstates does not share its structure
with that of airlines. The Interstate will remain relatively intact when we take away New York,
Houston and Cleveland. On the other hand, it would prove devastating if we did the same to the
airline network (cf. [BB03]). More broadly, there is not much variance in the degree of nodes in
the Interstate network, whereas the airline network has a limited number of heavily wired cities.
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The BA network (figure 7(b)) explains the latter network better, as it follows a power law.
It should be noted, however, that what is geographically visible may not represent the real
network that our economy relies on in effect. The Interstate network exhibits an ER-type topology
as in figure 6. Nonetheless, the economy may operate a transportation network of a scale-free
class on it. Shipment from Memphis has to go through St. Louis even if its final destination is
Chicago. In this case Memphis is connected to Chicago in a single step rather than in two steps
via St. Louis. For a carrier making Chicago-bound shipment from Memphis, St. Louis (a seeming
layover node) is no different from the cornfield they pass through along the way (just a part of
the edge), in that neither one of them add anything to the shipment. An economically relevant
network is buried beneath the easily noticeable surface network and we do not want to confuse
one with the other.
It is very important to note here a difference between the literature on dynamic social network
formation and transportation networks. In the standard economics literature on social networks,
for example Mele [Mel10] or Christakis et al [CFIK10], it is the individual agents, represented
by nodes, who make decisions about forming links among themselves. In contrast, the nodes of
a transport network are cities. Typically, it is not the cities or their agents who make decisions
about forming links. Rather, it is another agent who controls an entire networks, for example the
federal government in the case of highways or airlines in the case of an airline system.
2.1.3 The City-Size Distribution Is Scale Free Too
The city-size distribution has a distinct feature. Figure 8 plots the frequency of the city-size
distribution from US Census 2000. It is only when we take the log of population (figure 8(b))
that the distribution exhibits resemblance to a familiar Gaussian distribution. Black and Hen-
derson [BH03] and Soo [Soo05] explain how widespread scale-free distributions are in urban
economics1. Under the scale-free distribution, the arithmetic mean (Hillsboro, TX in figure 8)
1 Scale-free distributions are commonplace in the socioeconomic realm. It seems that something of an additive
nature presides over natural phenomena, leading to a Gaussian distribution, and something of multiplicative nature
(cf. [LSA01]) is at work among socioeconomic phenomena, leading to a scale-free domain. We study the latter.
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becomes less interpretive and the geometric mean (Sutton, NE) takes over the role of the average
in the conventional sense.
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Figure 8. Frequency plot of the city-size distribution. Dots are size proportionate. See table 7 for explana-
tion of the cities selected in the figure. Data source: US Census 2000.
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The fat-tailed distribution also makes its appearance on a map. Figure 9 illustrates the popu-
lation density of each metropolitan and micropolitan statistical area (MSA and SA, collectively
referred to as Core Based Statistical Area, CBSA) in the United States in 2000. Most of the cities
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Figure 9. Population density by CBSA (persons/km2). Data source: Census 2000.
have a low density and are painted in blue; there are only few cities that are green and only two
cities are colored in red. If the city-size distribution followed a Gaussian distribution or Poisson
distribution with a large mean2, most of the cities should be green and only a few should be in
blue or red. Just as for the airline network in figure 7(a), if we take away the ten largest US cities,
we will leave more than a quarter of urban population unaccounted for.
Our main findings are as follows. City sizes are positively related to their degree. A city
with a high degree has good accessibility to other cities. Reduced transportation cost makes the
city’s product inexpensive and stimulates a large demand. As a consequence, the city creates
large-scale employment. However, a marginal increase in degree contributes less to the city size
as the degree increases. If a city is well-connected, then adding a new link to the city will not
increase accessibility much because the city is already readily accessible from other cities through
2As in the degree distribution of an ER network.
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the existing grid.
We test implications of our model with Belgian and US data. The BA network leads to a result
comparable to existing models, whereas the ER network fails to replicate the empirical city-size
distribution. This confirms that the BA transport network is more consistent with reality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2.2, we will go over the two types of
network structures mentioned above as a preamble to the next section, where we introduce and
develop a model of spatial equilibrium with a transportation network woven into it. Particularly,
in section 2.3.8, we will connect the network structure to the city-size distribution. In section 2.4,
we verify the prediction of our model with data before we draw conclusions from our project in
section 3.5.
2.2 Preliminaries
We will briefly review how ER and BA networks are built and examine the qualitative differences
in terms of their degree distributions before we apply them to transportation networks.
2.2.1 ER Networks
The ER network is the simplest random graph of all. A pair of nodes are connected with a fixed
connection probability. A completely isolated graph illustrated in figure 4 and complete graph
illustrated in figure 5 are the special cases of the ER network where connection probability is
zero and one, respectively.
The degree distribution of an ER network follows a Poisson distribution. The important fea-
ture is that the degree distribution is concentrated around its arithmetic mean3 and we rarely
observe a city with an exceedingly large degree. All pairs of nodes share the same ex-ante con-
nection probability, which leads to a small variance, and the network is egalitarian in that sense.
3Recall that arithmetic mean does not mean much for scale-free distributions like the city-size distribution or a BA
degree distribution.
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2.2.2 BA Networks
The degree distribution of most real network structures does not follow a Poisson distribution.
Rather, it follows a power law. This class of networks is called scale free. There are a number of
proposed generative models that lead to power-law degree distributions (see Section VII of Albert
and Baraba´si [AB02] for a review). To get a sense of how power-law type behavior emerges,
consider the BA model [BA99] for example. Two major characteristics of BA model are growth
and preferential attachment. The model sets off with a complete graph of a fixed number of
nodes as a starting grid. New nodes with edges will be added sequentially to the existing
network (growth).
As we can see from this mechanism, in general, older nodes are likely to gain an excessively
large number of edges. The rich get richer because they are already rich (known as the Matthew
effect). The rest of the nodes are merely mediocre in terms of degree. They are poor because they
are already poor. This type of variance in degree hardly arises with an ER network. That is, New
York City will not happen if the links are formed uniformly at random. Compare BA network
figure 7(b) to ER network figure 6(b). BA network is not egalitarian, as connection probability
depends on the number of acquired edges, which is path dependent. We shall also employ
the network structure of Jackson and Rogers [JR07] that contains both the ER and BA types of
networks as special cases. Details shall be provided in section 2.3.8.
2.3 Model
We propose a model where the trading costs of commodities among cities are explicitly specified.
The city-size distribution is derived as a result of gains from trade and the underlying transport
network configuration.
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2.3.1 Location-Specific Commodities
There are J cities in the economy, with index j. A city is defined as a geographic entity within
which it produces the same commodity and from within which the geodesic paths (the shortest
path on the network) to any other city in the country have the same length. If Adam and Beth
both live in St. Louis, then they have the same shipping cost schedule to everywhere in the nation.
We know they are in different cities if Adam pays a 10% shipping charge to San Francisco and a
5% charge to Minneapolis, whereas Beth pays a 10% charge to San Francisco but an 8% charge
to Minneapolis. The endogenous population of city j is given by s j and in total, there are
JX
j=1
s j = S (8)
households in the economy. Each household supplies a unit of labor inelastically. City j produces
consumption commodity c j in a competitive environment. We assume that technology exhibits
constant returns to scale and that one unit of labor produces one unit of commodity. In what
follows a superscript denotes a city of production or origin, whereas a subscript denotes a city
of consumption or destination.
The delivered price of commodity j in city i is denoted by p ji . The value of marginal product
p jj  1 coincides with the local wage w j in equilibrium:4
p jj = w
j (9)
Consumer preferences are represented by a Cobb-Douglas utility function of the form u(ci) =
1
J
PJ
j=1 log(c
j
i ). The set of consumption bundles is constrained by the budget w
i  PJj=1 p jic ji .
4Note that p jj denotes the mill price.
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2.3.2 Network Infrastructure and Delivered Price
The economy has a network infrastructure   = (V;E), where V = f1;    ; Jg denotes the set of
vertices representing each city and E denotes a set of edges. For example a completely iso-
lated graph in figure 4 is given by   = (f1;    ; 50g; ;) and a complete graph in figure 5 by
  =
 f1;    ; 50g; fi; jg : 1  i < j  50	. All the traffic flow will follow  . We assume that the
network is unipartite (i.e., there is a path between any pair of nodes) to avoid multiple equilibria.
Whereas consumers in city j can consume any commodity in the economy, they have to incur an
extra iceberg transport cost to consume commodities brought in from other cities. Transportation
cost piles up as a commodity travels from city to city along the path. To describe the exact trans-
port cost structure, we define a metric lij : V  V ! R+ to measure a geodesic length between
node i and j given  . The delivered price of commodity j shipped to city i is given by
p ji = 
l jip jj; (10)
where ( 1) marks the iceberg transportation parameter. We use the iceberg transport technol-
ogy, standard in urban economics, for tractability reasons.5 If you dispatch  units of commodity
to your neighboring city, one unit of it will be delivered and the rest melts en route. The delivered
price snowballs as the package travels from one city to another and the initial mill price is inflated
by l
i
j by the time the package reaches its final destination lij steps over. We assume that all the
links share the same value of . The large fraction of transportation cost is a location-invariant
fixed cost. Having  dependent on each link will not add much to our analysis but will make
our equilibrium analytically insolvable.
5For detailed discussion, see McCann [McC05].
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2.3.3 Equilibrium
Simple calculations yield the Marshallian demand for commodity c ji :
'
j
i (p
1
i ;    ; pJi ;wi) = wi(l
j
ip jj)
 1J 1:
The aggregate demand for commodity j is the sum of demand from all the cities in the country:
C j(p;w) B
P
i2V si'
j
i ().6 Recalling that each household supplies one unit of labor inelastically and
one unit of labor produces one unit of output, the commodity market j clears when
s j = C j(p;w) =

p jj
 1
J 1
X
i2V
siwi (11)
The indirect utility function is given by
v(p1i ;    ; pJi ;wi) = 1J
PJ
j=1 log'
j
i ()
= logwi   log J   1J
P
j2V log p
j
j   ai log ;
where
ai B
1
J
JX
j=1
l ji = hlii (12)
is a remoteness parameter, or an average geodesic length from city i, where li : j 7! l ji . In what
follows hxi denotes the average value of x. The parameter measures how hard it is to reach city j
from other cities in the economy. The higher the value is, the more remote the city is because we
have to go through many links to get there. We will explore the role of accessibility later.
Free mobility of consumers implies
v(p1i ;    ; pJi ;wi) = v(p1j ;    ; pJj;w j) (13)
6 This expression may seem incredulous at first, for it does not include . A large  discourages demand but it also
means that firms have to ship more commodities. A large portion of shipment will melt on its way. They cancel each
other in equilibrium. This propitious cancellation may not occur with other preference specifications.
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for all i; j 2 V in equilibrium.
The equilibrium (s1;    ; sJ; p11;    ; pJJ;w1;    ;wJ) satisfies (8), (9), (11) and (13). Utility equal-
ization (13) leads to
log pii   log p jj = (ai   a j) log : (14)
Equation (14), together with (11), implies s j = ai a jsi. With the population condition (8), we
obtain the city-size distribution
si =
S
ai
P
j2V  a j
: (15)
2.3.4 How Does a Network Break Symmetry?
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An obvious implication of (15) is that cities
with better accessibility have larger equilib-
rium population. Naturally, we are tempted
to conclude that the entire population will col-
lapse into the city with the best accessibility
and the rest of the cities will be completely va-
cated. As it turns out, this is not the case. The
city-size distribution will not become degen-
erate. Let us break down (15) both mathemat-
ically and economically to see why.
First, let us recast the relationship (15) to
explore how accessibility translates to the pop-
ulation of a city. We can rewrite (15) as s(ai) = hsi ai=h ai, where hsi B S=J is a base city size
and h ai B P j  a j=J gives the average of  a j . The city size spreads around the canonical size
hsi. A better accessibility (i.e., small remoteness value ai) contributes to the city by augmenting
the baseline size hsi by a factor of  ai=h ai. The multiplier is large when  ai is greater than the
national average h ai and vice versa. Furthermore, the multiplier grows more than proportionally
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as the city’s accessibility improves as can be seen in figure 10. The multiplier  ai is monotone
decreasing and convex in ai. Does this mean New York City sweeps away all the population off
the rest of the cities? — Not really. And it calls for an economic exposition of (15) to see why.
Although restricted accessibility of a city raises its delivered prices, demand for its produced
commodity does not cease to exist. Eliminating a commodity from the basket will punish con-
sumers a lot. They appreciate variety and missing a single variety will push the utility level
down to negative infinity. Workers in a poorly connected city will have to pay a high price for
imported commodities due to a poor network infrastructure, but they are compensated with a
high nominal wage, as indicated by the wage (9) and utility equalization (14). These two equa-
tions imply that the mill price (and ultimately, the nominal wage) is positively related to the
average geodesic length hlii from city i in equilibrium, i.e., a sparsely connected city has a high
mill price. The prices adjust to make it worth living in small cities in equilibrium. The scale of
local production is small, but each commodity is sold high to make up for an increased cost of
living due to remoteness and the resulting costly transport.
Variance in city sizes is solely due to the structure of the network. The above-mentioned
trade-off entails two counteracting forces. The agglomerative force is heterogenous accessibility,
which tends to spread out the city-size distribution. The dispersion force is preference for variety,
which tends to push the distribution back to a collection of equal-sized cities.
There are alternative ways to derive city size with a tractable economic model, particularly for
the dispersion force. In this model, location-specific commodity production drives dispersion, as
a bundle of all goods is desired by consumers. An alternative model would use another natural
dispersive force, say housing or land markets. If we had just a few produced commodities (say
one for illustration), then Starrett’s Spatial Impossibility Theorem (Fujita and Thisse [FT02], Ch.2)
applies, and we would have an autarkic equilibrium where no commodity is transported.7 Yet
another alternative is to introduce a congestion externality, but then the model begins to look
more complicated and, at the same time, arbitrary.
7Starrett’s Theorem makes no assumption about the transport network or transport cost.
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Obviously, this trade-off disappears and there will be no variance in city sizes if the agglom-
erative force is removed. This can happen when shipment becomes costless (to be discussed
in proposition 2.3.1) or network structure becomes redundant, that is, if it turns into a com-
plete graph. Although we introduced a location-specific technology, commodities are symmetric.
Technology is linear everywhere. Consumer preferences are identical and they put the same
weight on each commodity. If we take the network structure out of the equation, the resulting
equilibrium is such that all the cities share the same size hsi and every household consumes an
equal portion of all the commodities available.
2.3.5 Transportation Cost Skews the City-Size Distribution
Along with remoteness ai, transportation cost  plays a leading role in the determination of the
city-size distribution. Depending on its magnitude,  can nullify or amplify the influence of a
network structure over the economy. Figure 10 compares the relationship between accessibility
and the city-size distribution under different transportation costs.
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Figure 11. D() measures the convexity of s(ai). The
midpoint (aH + aL)=2 is given by aM above.
In the extreme situation where shipment is
free ( = 1), all the cities will be of an equal
size regardless of the network structure. The
city size s(ai) becomes constant against ai (see
the blue line in figure 10). The network be-
comes a complete graph in effect, because the
delivered price will be the same no matter how
long the geodesic length is. For  > 1, city size
(15) becomes a strictly convex function of re-
moteness.
The transportation network   starts to sink
in as  grows. A large  implies that the geodesic length exerts a more dominant influence on
the size of a city. With a small value of , a city with good accessibility does not distinguish itself
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well from other cities because the effect of path length is limited due to low transportation cost.
On the other hand, if shipping is costly, a city with a good accessibility benefits from a low ai
value because high transportation cost amplifies the effect of accessibility. In other words, a high
transportation cost reveals the network structure and projects the network   onto the city-size
distribution in a more pronounced, clear-cut manner than with a low transportation cost. As a
result, holding the remoteness distribution constant, large  skews the city-size distribution and
makes the emergence of disproportionately large hubs more likely. To measure how the cost of
transportation  bends the city-size distribution, consider a measure
D() =
s(aH) + s(aL)
2
  s
aH + aL
2

;
where aH and aL are the highest and lowest remoteness of a given network. The first term is the
average of the smallest and the largest city whereas the second term is the city size of average
remoteness. For a given distribution of remoteness ai, D()measures the convexity of s(ai), which
gauges how spread out the distribution of city size s(ai) is for each . See figure 11. When  = 1,
s() lays flat and D() = 0. As  grows, s() bends more and D() grows accordingly as can be seen
in figure 10.
We confirm the observation above as follows:
Proposition 2.3.1: Transportation Cost Skews the City-Size Distribution
Suppose that the economy has a unipartite network  . The city-size distribution si is a convex function of
remoteness ai for   1. Moreover, the degree of convexity measured by the size difference D() between
the city of average size and the city of average remoteness increases with .
Proof. See appendix A.3. 
2.3.6 Geodesic-Length Distribution
The city-size distribution (15) depends on the distribution of remoteness (12), which, in turn,
rests on the distribution of geodesic length. While most of the research on network topology is
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focused on mean intervertex distance ([NSW01], [FFH04], [ZLG+09]), what we need here is the
geodesic length between individual nodes. Mean intervertex distance comes in handy when we
gauge how efficient a network is, but we are not here to see if the transportation network that
our economy relies on is optimally configured (that would be another paper). We would like to
derive the city-size distribution, not the average size of cities or the remoteness thereof.
There is not much research that looks into the geodesic length between each pair of nodes.
At the time of writing, the analytical form of geodesic length between individual nodes is yet
to be discovered8. There is an attempt to track down the geodesic length by guessing the ana-
lytical form from sequentially generated, fractal-like networks reverse-engineered from a Pareto
degree distribution ([DMO06]), which we cannot use because our distribution (21) is not a Pareto
distribution.
Hołyst et al [HSF+05] take a different approach to derive an intuitive solution for a wide
range of network types. They measure the expected geodesic length between any pair of nodes i
and j as follows:
lij = A   B log(kik j); (16)
where A B 1 + log(Jhki)= log and B B (log) 1. The number ki denotes the degree of node i.
Rearrange the nodes so that we have a tree with node i as its root. The average number of children
is called an average branching factor and denoted by . For more details see appendix A.4.
Although [HSF+05] does not provide a formal proof of (16), but rather is based on a heuristic,
it appears to be the best we can do given the current state of network theory. Zhang et al
[ZLG+09] provide an analytical background for the mean intervertex distance for a special case.
We hope that its extension to individual distances will become available in the near future.
Meanwhile, (16) proves to be quite useful in translating a network structure into economic
context without loss of generality. A path length is a global property whereas a degree is a local
property. We cannot compute the individual geodesic path unless we compare all the possible
8 The one for the average intervertex separation has already been brought out into the open. Cf. [NW99], [NMW00],
[ZLG+09].
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pathes between a city pair of interest and pick the shortest one, which calls for a systemic search
all across the board. The geodesic path thus obtained is too specific to the particular network in
question and does not have wide implications beyond the specific network itself. Degree is much
easier to compute because we do not have to launch a nationwide search for it, and the degree
distribution is readily available for a wide range of networks. Equation (16) succinctly writes a
global property (a path length) in terms of the analytically manageable local property (a degree).
It implies that the path length will be short if your city and/or your destination city have many
edges to choose from to begin with and/or to end with. This abundance in selection should save
you from being thrown to circuitous paths, and vice versa when your degree is small. Absent
this conversion of the global property into the local property, we would not be able to describe
a general relationship between degree and city size, when in fact, there is an obvious symbiotic
interaction between them waiting to be investigated.
2.3.7 City-Size Distribution
From (16), remoteness (12) is written as
ai(= hlii) = A   B log ki   Bhlog ki: (17)
We observe that accessibility improves as a city acquires more edges, but only on the logarithmic
order. Taking the log of (15), we have
log si = logS   (A   B log ki   Bhlog ki) log    log
0BBBBBB@X
j
 a j
1CCCCCCA :
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The last term is approximated by log J   hai log 9 so that
log si = loghsi + B log   log ki   hlog ki : (18)
A couple of observations are in order. The equation above answers two questions concerning
the relationship between a network structure and a system of cities. The first one is ”Does
construction of an edge boost the local economy?” The answer is ”Apparently.” The second, and
more interesting question is ”How so?” The answer is twofold.
In terms of a linear scale, (18) can be rewritten as si = hsi

ki

B log 
, where  B
QJ
i=1 k
1=J
i is
the geometric mean of the degree. It indicates that city size is anchored around the base city
size hsi multiplied by the deviation (ki=)B log . If a city has a large degree, then its size becomes
larger than the standard city size by a factor of (ki=)B log  and vice versa for a city with a small
degree. The city size coincides with the cornerstone size of hsi exactly when its degree matches
the national (geometric) average.10 The deviation is amplified as shipment becomes costly, which,
in turn, confirms our observation made in proposition 2.3.1.
We also note that adding an edge to a city increases its size, but the change in size is inversely
proportional to the current degree provided B log  < 1. If city i is highly wired already, then the
introduction of a new edge to city j does not add much to city i. The geodesic length to city j is
already short before the establishment of the new edge. You can go to many cities in a single step
and city j is likely to be linked to at least one of those many neighboring cities already, making
the geodesic length to city j just two. The added edge will only reduce the geodesic length by
9 Let *a B (a1; a2;    ; aJ) and h*ai B (hai; hai;    ; hai). The Taylor series expansion about *a = h*ai tends to
log
P
j 
 a j

= log
P
j 
 hai + (*a   h*ai) D log P j  a j *a=h*ai +O [(*a   h*ai)  (*a   h*ai)]
! log J   hai log ;
by the law of large numbers.
10 This examination begs one question: If my city has the average number of edges, is my city larger or smaller
than the national average in size? The answer is ”larger”. Since transportation cost and the branching factor are both
greater than one, log log is positive. Plus, the geometrical mean is smaller than the arithmetic mean. To score a national
average hsi you only need  edges. It should be noted, however, that in a scale-free world, arithmetic mean does not
carry much information. The lognormal is the new normal (or any heavy-tailed distribution is for that matter) and
the geometric average is the new average in this world as we saw in figure 8(b).
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one. On the other hand, if the current degree of city i is low, then the link to city j will not only
reduce the geodesic length to city j greatly but also reduce the geodesic lengths to the cities in
city j’s neighborhood. Consequently, city i will see significant reduction in its average geodesic
length.
Based on the degree-size relationship (18), our main theoretical result gives the city-size dis-
tribution as follows:
Proposition 2.3.2: City-Size Distribution
Suppose that the economy has a unipartite network   with the associated degree distribution G(k). The
city-size distribution of this economy follows the distribution function F(s), defined by
F(s) = G(k(s)); (19)
where k(s) B (s=hsi) loglog  . Its probability density function (PDF) is
f (s) = k0(s)1[k(s)] =
log
log 
k(s)s 11 [k(s)] ; (20)
where 1() denotes the PDF of degree k.
Since the transport cost and average branching factor only come into the equation in the form
of a quotient of their logarithmic values, loglog  , we will denote this by  for estimation purposes,
in which case, (20) becomes f (s) = hsi s 11 [k(s)]. As we have already seen a small  stretches
out the distribution and a large  does the opposite.
2.3.8 City-Size Distribution under Different Network Systems
Now that we have the city-size distribution based on the city’s degree, we can make our predic-
tions based on different transport network structures. There are two network models of particular
interest: ER and BA networks.
Note that empirical determination of the transport network relevant to the formation of a
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system of cities is a tough job. The task at hand is to find a network that is consistent with
the real city-size distribution (and we have already discarded complete and completely isolated
networks in section 2.3.4). The most consistent network structure will give us a clue as to the
shape of a network that is germane to the formation of cities.
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Figure 12. Probability density function of degree
with k0 = 0 and m = 10.
Jackson and Rogers [JR07] constructed a
degree distribution of a directed11 dynamic
network as follows:
G(k) = 1  
 
k0 + rm
k + rm
!1+r
for k  k0; (21)
where k0 denotes an in-degree with which
an entering node is endowed. This value is
shared across all the nodes. The ratio of the
number of links formed by an ER-like random
connection and a BA-like network-based con-
nection is given by r, and m is the average out-degree of a node. Five PDF’s of (21) are depicted in
figure 12 as a visual cue. In the figure parameter r ranges from .01 (over 99% network-based and
less than 1% random links) to 100 (the other way around). A predominantly random PDF (with
large r) tapers off quickly whereas a mostly network-based PDF (with small r) only gradually
dissipates with degree. We expect that our economy operates with a small r. In what follows we
refer to in-degree as the degree unless otherwise stated. BA network’s degree distribution is (21)
with r = 0, in which case, (21) turns into a Pareto distribution. ER network calls for r ! 1, in
which case (21) is no longer well defined and the degree distribution turns into an exponential
distribution.12
11Commodities can flow either way on an edge. We take an arrowhead on a directed edge just as a decorative
memorabilia indicating from which end the edge was constructed, but nothing more. We represent degree distribution
by an in-degree distribution. It is impossible to tell different networks apart with an out-degree distribution due to
the way a network is constructed in [JR07]. Any network comes with a degenerate out-degree distribution.
12 The original ER network [ER59] comes with a Poisson degree distribution rather than an exponential degree
distribution. The differences in the distribution arise from the way the network is constructed: [JR07] is dynamic,
whereas [ER59] is static.
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What is left to do is write the mean branching factor  in terms of other parameters in
(21) before we can fully identify the city-size distribution.13 The actual mean branching factor
cannot be computed until after the network is formed. Hołyst et al [HSF+05] provide a good
approximate to :
 =
JX
k=1
k
k1(k)PJ
x=1 x1(x)
  1 =
P
k(2k   1)G(k)P
xG(x)
  1 = 
2
k + 
2
k
k
  1; (22)
where k and 2k denote the mean and variance of k, respectively. For details, see appendix A.5.
While [JR07] is microfounded and sufficient to generate a fat-tailed degree distribution, it is
not necessarily the only degree distribution which a BA network gives rise to. There is a chance
that our economy’s transportation network may have come around from a different mechanism
than [JR07]. In this regard we experimented with other fat-tail distributions as a candidate degree
distribution along with (21). In particular, we tested lognormal and generalized extreme value
(GEV) distributions for use as a degree distribution. To our knowledge, these degree distributions
are not yet microfounded.
2.4 Empirical Implementation
Now that the model with an explicit transport system is at the ready, we will pitch it against the
actual city-size distributions to identify what class of network governs the city-size distribution.
By and large the results are in full support of our initial inkling that a scale-free network explains
the city-size distribution but ER or other network structures commonly adopted do not.
All told, we have four sets of data on our plate: Belgium, Metropolitan Area (MA), CBSA and
Places.14 Descriptive statistics for each data set are in table 7.
13The branching factor is not a free parameter and it cannot be directly estimated from the data, because the
estimation algorithm will either explode or create indeterminacy. It is dependent on the shape of the network, which,
in turn, is characterized by the other parameters via (22).
14 The Belgian data is provided courtesy of Soo [Soo05] and the remainder are from US Census 2000. For definitions
of MA and CBSA, see http://www.census.gov/population/metro/about/ and for Places, see http://www.census.
gov/geo/reference/gtc/gtc_place.html. We thank Jan Eeckhout for sharing his data used in [Eec04].
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The Belgian data is included to see if our model’s predictive value is subject to both the area
and population size of a country under study. (It was not.) MA and CBSA are a popular choice
in the literature. The smallest unit of measurement is a county and they suffer from data trunca-
tion ([Eec04]). Places have the finest unit of measurement and are free of truncation. We tested
the following five distributions against them: ER/BA, BA, lognormal, GEV and the degenerate
distribution. The first two distributions are estimated in three ways: maximum spacing esti-
mation (MSE), minimum Kolomogorov-Smirnov estimation (minKS) and maximum likelihood
estimation (MLE), and the remainder in MSE.
In what follows a hat on parameter x indicates its estimate, xˆ.
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2.4.1 Estimation Methods Employed
The first choice is to go for MLE, which does not work with (21). The likelihood function is
monotone increasing in k0. As a workaround to MLE, we calculated the estimates by MSE.
While its use is limited in the city-size literature so far especially when compared to MLE, it is
more robust and easier to handle than MLE. The problem we have with MLE is exactly the one
exemplified in Ranneby [Ran84] and we used his solution. The MSE estimator maximizes the
geometric mean of the gap or step between two adjacent CDF’s
F(si;)   F(si 1;);
where  is a vector of parameters to be estimated and data sequence s is rearranged in the
ascending order s1  s2      sJ.15 The idea here is to split the interval [0; 1], the range of a
CDF, in J steps in the way that none of the assigned F(si;) will create a disruptively large gap
with its neighbors and the gaps should be evenly spaced as much as possible on the logarithmic
scale. Maximizing the arithmeticmean does not work here because it will always be 1=J no matter
what estimates we toss in. This actually works as a ap on our geometric mean in turn, by Jensen’s
inequality. Thus, we can safely rule out the possibility that the maximand tends to infinity, which
is exactly the reason why we had to discard MLE. For more on MSE, see appendix A.6.
2.4.2 A Scale-Free Transportation Network Explains the City-Size
Distribution
Estimation with four different data sets unanimously chooses BA over ER as the underlying
transport network in our economy. We report our results in table 6 and figures 13 to 16 along
with other distributions.
15 The first and last gap are defined by F(s1;)   F( 1;) and F(1;)   F(sJ;) each.
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Figure 13. Model Comparison (Belgium)
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Figure 14. Model Comparison (MA)
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Figure 15. Model Comparison (CBSA)
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Figure 16. Model Comparison (Places)
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(b) PDF for MA
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Figure 17. MSE for Belgium (left) and MA (right)
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Figure 18. MSE for MSA (left) and Places (right)
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ER/BA in the table corresponds to (21). We left the estimated distribution functions for ER/BA
in figures 17 and 18.
As low values of rˆ indicate, edges are formed predominantly through networking rather than
by random selection. We cross-checked estimates with minKS and MLE16 and we obtained a
similar result. To be doubly sure of our findings, we ran estimation with r ! 1. ER in table 6
lists the statistics with r!1. The statistics of ER seem to be comparable with other distributions
except that the estimated transportation cost is unreasonably high. A one-dollar pen will cost
more than the US GDP five towns over on the purely random network.17 Thus, we conclude that
a scale-free transportation network explains the city-size distribution but a scale-variant network
does not.
Estimated ˆ ranges from .9911 to 2.536.18 As we discussed in reference to (18) we confirm
that in most cases, the impact of adding an edge on city size wears off as degree itself becomes
saturated (it cannot exceed J  1), or put differently, New York has more edges, size for size, than
any other cities as it takes more edges to raise the city size as the city grows further.
We ran MSE with three other distributions representative of the existing city-size models
to compare with our model. Eeckhout [Eec04]’s model leads to a lognormal distribution and
Berliant and Watanabe [BW14] predict a GEV distribution as the city-size distribution. A com-
plete graph will result in a degenerate probability distribution. The BA economy fits comfortably
into the circle of existing testable models based on all the statistics we computed in table 6 (usu-
ally coming in second on all fronts except for Places).
In addition we put two other fat-tailed degree distributions to the test. The results (the last
two rows in table 6) seem to indicate that the network formation does not necessarily have to be
16With k0 fixed at zero to prevent explosion. MSE and minKS point kˆ0 towards zero.
17There is not enough variance in the ER degree distribution, certainly not power-law type behavior. To generate
the empirical city-size distribution, the ER economy has to amplify and capitalize on what little variance its degree
distribution has to offer (cf. proposition 2.3.1). As a result  has to be ludicrously large to make things work. On
the other hand, if the transportation infrastructure is in its early stage of development without any hubs, then the
country’s transportation cost will probably be higher than more BA-like countries because Zipf’s law is a universally
observed phenomenon. There is a trade-off between  and how close the transport network is to BA, provided that
Zipf’s law holds at all times.
18The estimate tends to decrease as data size J increases.
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of [JR07] type. Regardless of how it came about, a network with a fat-tailed degree distribution
results in the city-size distribution that closely resembles the actual distribution.
2.5 Conclusion and Extensions
We examined how the network of cities affects the city-size distribution. We built a simple
economic model with an explicit transport network. The bridge between network structure and
city size is represented in (18), where we learned that there is a log-linear relationship between city
size and city degree.
We put two commonly studied networks to the test. The classical ER random graph is too
egalitarian to generate gravitationally large cities like New York City. The BA model explains
the city-size distribution better than the ER model and bears very close comparison with other
proposed city-size models in existence. The BA network has a scale-free degree distribution
and the resulting city-size distribution behaves similarly via (18). In fact, it would be odd if the
city-size distribution was not scale free under a BA network. Large nodes with a high degree
like Chicago attract a large mass of people because A) goods produced in Chicago are in high
demand for its inexpensive delivered price owing to its high degree and B) goods available for
consumption in Chicago are also inexpensive thanks to its high degree. The exact opposite
applies to small cities. But there are still some people knowingly living in small cities because
we cannot afford to wipe them off the map due to preference for variety. This gives rise to a few
cities of an overwhelming size and a myriad of small cities. The actual city-size distributions (we
tried Belgium and the United States in particular) unanimously opt for a BA network.
From this point on, it would be reasonable to combine GEV to determine firm productivity
as in [BW14] and BA for transportation network structure by way of simulations, but we will not
have an analytical solution due to the added complexity.
We argued that network structures motivate the population to form a specific distribution of
city sizes. The structure of the network is pre-selected. Considering the fact that it is easier to
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relocate people than to build transport infrastructure, this is not an unreasonable assumption in
the short run. New York City would have been much smaller had it not been the entrepoˆt to
Europe. However, the degree-city relationship is not a one-way street. It may be the other way
around: the relocation of people forces the transportation network to follow a specific pattern.
It can also be the case that the network structure and its associated city-size distribution are in
fact a product of some common underlying causes. The United States has seen a number of
drastic changes in its network structure. Tracing the historical co-development of the network
structure with the city-size distribution may reveal a clue to identifying the direction of causality.
A problem with this methodology is that transportation networks are not unique, in that there
are generally multiple modes of transport and multiple companies providing services in each
mode.
For now, as a preview, consider a commodity transportation firm that is installing a trans-
portation network that maximizes its profit by choosing r. It uses the mechanism described by
[JR07] to add links to its network, namely random links and friends of friends, where r de-
termines the relative proportions. As noted in the introduction, the difference between social
networks and transportation networks is who makes the decisions about links, the nodes them-
selves or the owner of the network. If the revenues and cost of the network are additive across
nodes, then the profit from a network is additive across nodes, so there is no distinction between
maximizing the objective of a node and maximizing profit or utility of the entire network. In
other words, profit of the network owner corresponds to efficiency of the network in [JR07].
Suppose that shipping industry is competitive and the shipping firm’s indirect revenue function
is additively separable across nodes and convex in node degree, and also assume that its cost
is additive across nodes and proportional to node degree. Then we can follow the framework
proposed in section IV of [JR07], in particular Corollary 1, to find r that maximizes its profit, in-
dependent of the city-size distribution. This allows us to take the network development process
as exogenous, and leading to the BA network r = 0.
We finish our discussion with one last remark. It has been suggested that other networks be
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implemented in our framework, for example the optimal transport network for a given popula-
tion distribution (assuming a cost function). This would require the geodesic length or degree
distribution for the optimal network. We are not aware of any results addressing this issue.
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Chapter 3
A Spatial Production Economy Explains Gross
Metropolitan Product
3.1 Introduction
Four out of five people live in cities, and they do so for various reasons, i.e. better job prospects,
decent wage, urban amenities, or family obligations. The resulting size distribution of cities
has kept the rapt attention of urban economists, and we now have a growing understanding of
what it is and how it came about; however, the story does not end there. No one moves in or
out of a city just for the sake of making its size larger or smaller, nor does the city size itself
feed its population. The overriding research objective in the literature is the welfare implication
of the city-size distribution, but the empirical distribution of GMP has never been anaylized to
this date. We will take one step forward to show that the GMP distribution follows a fat-tail
distribution and provide a theoretical background behind the relationship between city size and
corresponding GMP.
Our major findings are as follows. First, two empirical regularities on the city-size distribution
carry over to GMP. Most of GDP are generated in only a few cities just as the city-size distribution,
the regularity known as Zipf’s law ([Gab99b], [Dur07]). In fact only 20% of cities create as much
as 78.75% of urban GDP.1 GMP has a lower Pareto coefficient than city-size counterpart, i.e.,
its tail end is even heavier than the city-size distribution. Gibrat’s law also extends to GMP, as
urban economic growth rates are independent of its GMP size. Second, GMP exhibits increasing
returns to employment. That is, New York’s GMP is larger than any other city’s, even size for
size. This is consistent with our first finding that the GMP distribution has a heavier tail than the
1 This relation is known as a 20-80 rule: 20% of agents are accountable for 80% of the results, a typical sign that
something of scale-free nature is at work.
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city-size distribution. We build a production economy model and establish that agglomeration
economies are due to the trade-off between externalities and housing consumption. We prove
that the equilibrium city size has to be such that an additional resident will reduce a housing lot
size in the city but make up for it by raising citywide productivity.
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x 104
Figure 19. GMP per capita in 2010 (in 2005 USD).
In the existing city-size models, with
the assumption of free mobility, consumers/
workers will update their locations until they
exhaust the locational arbitrage opportunities.
Thus, regardless of the city size, cities become
indifferent to consumers in equilibrium. This
does not imply that workers are equally pro-
ductive or their income will be the same across
the board. In practice, per capita GMP varies
by location (cf. figure 19 and table 7). People
enjoy the same utility level at the end of the
day2 but what induces interurban migration
depends on GMP. People relocate to a city not for the sake of its size alone but for what its size has
to offer, one of which is its GMP. The city-size distribution is the result of interurban migration.
We will reveal the distribution of GMP and decode the economic forces behind it in this paper.
Figure 20 (in color) is a map of the United States with metropolitan statistical areas (MSA)
colored according to their population density and GMP in 2010.3 Figure 20(a) comes with no
surprise. It is well documented that the city-size distribution is tail heavy. What is newsworthy
is figure 20(b)4. GMP shares the same pattern to city size in terms of distribution. Figure 21
represents the probability density function (PDF) and rank-size plot of GMP in 2010.
New York accounts for the lion’s share of GDP, followed by Los Angeles, and there are lots
2 Cities are put in equilibrium either by equating wage (e.g., [Dur07]) or utility level (e.g., [Gab99b]).
3Population data also include micropolitan statistical area along with MSA. For definition of MSA, see http://
www.census.gov/population/metro/about/.
4Data source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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(a) Population Density in 2010 (persons=km2).
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(b) GMP in 2010 (in 2005 USD).
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Figure 21. PDF plots of GMP. See table 7 for the explanation of the selected cities above.
of mid-sized cities that are dwarfed by the high-ranked cities.
Our intended contribution is to provide a systematic understanding of the distribution of
GMP. The conventional range of study on GMP has been limited within a city. Usual questions
are in lines of how to promote the urban growth in Detroit, or the effect of overproduced liquid
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natural gas in Pittsburgh. These fact-finding works and analyses of local economies play a part in
the GMP distribution. GMP distribution is, after all, the accumulation of all these local economic
activities combined. On the other hand, we found a holistic approach to the GMP distribution
missing in the literature: GMP is reported in each city; therefore there will be a GMP distribution.
We would like to get an aerial view from coast to coast and address GMP from the general
equilibrium perspective.
There are two lines of research related to our project: one on the distribution of city sizes and
the other on agglomeration economies. The first line of research studies the distribution of city
sizes but not GMP, while the second one studies GMP but not the distribution thereof. We will
fill in the gaps in this paper.
Overshadowed by the consuming interest in the city-size distribution, research into the dis-
tribution of GMP is nonexistent. Those who quote the citywide production function use it as
an intermediate step to reach the equilibrium city-size distribution. As a byproduct, we get the
equilibrium production level in each city, but predicted GMP has never been tested with any
empirical data. Their primary objective is to explain the city-size distribution. We will take the
GMP distribution as a byword rather than a byproduct.
On the other hand, the second line of work homes in on the question of how much of a boost
we get by producing goods and services in a crowd rather than in a rural setting. The question
is imperative because if there is no scale economies in cities, then there is no convincing reason
to reside in a large but crowded city, barring other centripetal forces such as local public goods
or access to a large, diversified labor pool [ABL07]. A study on citywide productivity becomes an
essential part of the examination on city size (cf. [Hen74], [KKSS05]). In fact increasing returns to
scale is one of the main5 ingredients in the formation of a city (Krugman [Kru91]). See Moomaw
[Moo83] for review of earlier work in this literature.
Despite having related research agenda, these two lines of work take different approaches
to theorizing about their respective target objective. The city-size distribution models based on
5But not necessary. Cf. [BK00].
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general equilibrium typically do not include capital stock as part of production function ([Dur07],
[Eec04] for example);6 whereas most agglomeration models do. Labor alone serves its purpose to
explain the actual city-size distribution without involvement of capital stock. We sided with the
city-size distribution models for our purposes. It is easy to measure a city size, but measuring
citywide capital stock is not as straightforward as a head count. In fact there are no data on the
level of capital stock at city level in the Untied States. Those studies that quote capital stock use
the estimated level based on factors related to capital such as local public goods, housing and
state roads, mixed in with predetermined weights ([Seg76]), or estimated retrospectively from the
pair of labor and GDP per capita at city level ([Sve75]). Capital stock is known to be correlated
with city size, which causes a multi-collinearity problem. According to [Seg76], capital stock’s
contribution to GMP is .116 as opposed to labor’s .891. We did not test our model on capital
stock but it is general enough to incorporate investment if need be.
The data set we use is more inclusive than any previous studies. There are 366 cities with
accompanying GMP figures. The largest sample size used so far to test GMP is 30 by Mion and
Naticchioni [MN05] according to [MGN09].7 For example cities like Beaumont, TX are too small
to be included in the data set in [Seg76]. At the time of writing 366 is the largest data size for
which GMP is reported.
GMP data also mesh with city-size data to provide an added layer of empirical validation
to the existing models on the city-size distribution. The models of city-size distribution are
empirically tested on the basis of city size, and the choice of city size as a data set to pitch against
a model is obvious because they are built to explain the city-size distribution after all; however,
they also need to be crosschecked with other spatial data, including rent or wage in each city.
Otherwise a model can only explain city-size distribution but nothing else, which undermines
its legitimacy as an urban economic model. GMP is one of those spatial data that complements
city-size data to confirm a model’s relevance to the reality.
6There are some exceptions. For example, Rossi-Hansberg and Wright [RHW07] address city-size distribution with
capital stock incorporated into the model. Even then, actual capital stock level is not used for empirical testing.
7 The aforementioned study [Seg76] has 58 locations but output is limited to the manufacturing sector rather than
GMP as a whole. These studies often quote census for manufacturers alone.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 3.2 investigates into the nature of
GMP distribution and provides descriptive statistics on GMP along with city size. In section 3.3
we introduce the spatial production economy model to explain the findings in section 3.2 before
we empirically evaluate our model’s performance in section 3.4. Section 3.5 concludes our study.
3.2 GMP Actualities
We will establish the Zipf’s and Gibrat’s law for GMP and also identify the relationship between
GMP and city size. The US Bureau of Economic Analysis reports annual GDP by MSA along
with the US GDP and estimated employment. Descriptive statistics for the employed data are in
table 7.
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3.2.1 Gibrat’s Law for GMP
For starters, we looked into the dynamics: Does a large GMP make a city grow fast? The answer:
no. Gibrat’s law implies that the size of a city does not have any bearing on its growth rate. The
city-size distribution is known to follow Gibrat’s law well ([IO03]). It turns out that GMP does
the same. We carried out both parametric and non-parametric estimations following [Eec04] to
examine the relationship between GMP and GMP growth rate.
3.2.1.1 Non-Parametric Estimation
First we estimate the conditional expectation of GMP growth rate E[1jY] = m(Y)with a Nadaraya-
Watson kernel estimator [Wat64]
mˆ(Y) =
IX
i=1
1i
Kh(Y   Yi)PI
j=1 Kh(Y   Y j)
:
Y denotes GMP and 1 denotes its growth rate. Sample size is I = 366 with each city indexed by
a superscript i. Kh() is a scaled kernel with a bandwidth h. We gathered data from 2005 and
2010 to compute growth rates. For non-parametric estimation we standardize the growth rate
to take out the nationwide growth rate.8 GMP is defined by the geometric mean Y B
p
Y05Y10,
assuming exponential growth. Figure 22 plots the growth rate and its kernel estimation. We
tried to estimate mˆ(Y) first (figure 22(a))9. The disperse spread of GMP towards the upper end
swings the estimate from side to side and makes it hard to interpret the relationship. We went
for a log of GMP instead and recorded the result in figure 22(b), which now exhibits a discernible
pattern. There seems to be a slight inclination to the left and right tails, probably because of a
smaller number of observations to the both ends than in the rest of the range. Other than that,
our estimate seems to be in support of the Gibrat’s law for GMP. For analysis of variance, see
8 In particular we take the difference between
logYi10 logYi05
5 and the sample mean, divided by the standard deviation
to be the normalized growth rate 1i.
9 We had to stretch the bandwidth further than the usual width of 2.727e+10 to cover up the large gap between
New York and Los Angeles. The estimated growth rate is positive for GMP larger than 9e+11 and above solely because
of New York and significantly lower than zero because of Los Angeles around 6e+11 to 9e+11.
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10.
10
10
10
11
10
12
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
#
3
6
6
 P
a
lm
 C
o
a
s
t, F
L
 
#
1
8
3
 A
m
a
rillo
, T
X
 
#
1
6
5
 M
id
la
n
d
, T
X
#
1
5
2
 S
o
u
th
 B
e
n
d
, IN
 
#
1
2
3
 L
a
k
e
 C
h
a
rle
s
, L
A
 
#
6
1
 O
x
n
a
rd
, C
A
 
#
2
1
 P
o
rtla
n
d
, O
R
#
2
0
 S
t. L
o
u
is
 
#
1
7
 S
a
n
 J
o
s
e
#
1
3
 D
e
tro
it 
#
2
 L
o
s
 A
n
g
e
le
s
 
#
1
 N
e
w
 Y
o
rk
Geometric Mean GMP (in 2005 USD)
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
iz
e
d
 G
M
P
 G
ro
w
th
 R
a
te
#
3
6
6
 P
a
lm
 C
o
a
s
t, F
L
 
#
1
8
3
 A
m
a
rillo
, T
X
 
#
1
6
5
 M
id
la
n
d
, T
X
#
1
5
2
 S
o
u
th
 B
e
n
d
, IN
 
#
1
2
3
 L
a
k
e
 C
h
a
rle
s
, L
A
 
#
6
1
 O
x
n
a
rd
, C
A
 
#
2
1
 P
o
rtla
n
d
, O
R
#
2
0
 S
t. L
o
u
is
 
#
1
7
 S
a
n
 J
o
s
e
#
1
3
 D
e
tro
it 
#
2
 L
o
s
 A
n
g
e
le
s
 
#
1
 N
e
w
 Y
o
rk
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
iz
e
d
 G
M
P
 G
ro
w
th
 R
a
te
(b) Kernel regression on the log of GMP with bandwidth
h = :3932.
Figure 22.
appendix A.7.
3.2.1.2 Parametric Estimation
Next, we regress GMP growth rate on GMP.10 Estimates are reported in table 8. We first regressed
GMP growth rate on GMP. Figure 23(a) seems to indicate that the regression line is pulled up-
wards partly because of New York.11 To counteract this sensitivity to large cities, we regressed
GMP on the log of GMP as well (figure 23(b)).
Regressor R2 Figure
Intercept GMP log(GMP)
Coefficient 4.482e-03 6.981e-15 8.077e-04 23(a)
t-statistic 3.84 .54
Coefficient -2.373e-02 1.230e-03 5.044e-03 23(b)
t-statistic -1.13 1.36
Table 8. Ordinary least squared (OLS) estimate of growth rate.
10 We did not standardize the GMP growth rate for parametric estimation. The intercept will capture the nationwide
growth rate.
11 The coefficient on GMP may well have been negative had New York’s growth rate been negative. The estimates’
dependence on New York is not all that welcoming because, while it is large, New York is still just one observation as
much as Beaumont, TX is.
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The null is not rejected at the 5% level of confidence on GMP or on the log thereof. Once
again the estimates seem to agree with the Gibrat’s law.
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(a) OLS over GMP.
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(b) OLS over log of GMP.
Figure 23.
3.2.2 Zipf’s Law for GMP
As we have seen in figure 21, GMP seems to be well traced by a power law. OLS estimation
confirms the power-law behavior of GMP, as documented in table 9 and figure 24. The Pareto
Regressor R2 Figure
Intercept log(Employment) log(GMP)
Coefficient 16.34 -.9003 .9763 24(a)
t-statistic 174.57 -122.50
Coefficient 23.13 -.7875 .9756 24(b)
t-statistic 152.89 -120.58
Table 9. Rank-size and rank-GMP regression
exponent is -.9003 on employment12 whereas we have -.7878 on GMP. This is indicative of the
fact that the GMP distribution is even more skewed than the corresponding city-size distribution.
This is to be theoretically verified with proposition 3.3.2. It should be noted that the use of OLS
12Employment data are based on population estimates that the Bureau of Economic Analysis uses to compute per
capita GMP.
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Figure 24.
for rank-size plot is now obsolete. We have included OLS just for reference. As pointed out by
Gabaix and Ioannides [GI04], the city-size distribution does not sit well with the assumptions
on errors in OLS estimation. The same criticism applies to the GMP distribution as well. Also,
due to the limited data range, it is likely that Zipf’s law applies only to the upper tier and that
the un-truncated GMP distribution has a fat tail to the left as well (cf. [Eec04]). In this case, a
distribution other than a Pareto distribution, such as a lognormal or double Pareto lognormal
([GZS10]), may be an apt choice to describe the data. We will reconfirm Zipf’s law for GMP both
theoretically (in section 3.3.2.1) and empirically (in section 3.3.3) without OLS. The case in point
is not whether Zipf’s law describes the upper end of the distribution in particular but that the
GMP distribution has a fat tail.
3.2.3 City Size and GMP
Figure 25 shows the relationship between working population and the aggregate product in a city.
There seems to be a log-linear relationship between them with coefficient slightly but statistically
significantly larger than one, indicating increasing returns to scale between city size and GMP.
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Table 10 reports the results with figure 25.13
The numbers are not too far off from the findings from the second line of work mentioned
in section 3.1. For example Shefer [She73] finds that a 1% rise in input will results in a 1.12%
increase in output (note; however, that this is just for the primary metal industry, whereas our
numbers are for GMP).
13Note that
log(Y=L) = 0 + 1 log L ) logY = 0 + (1 + 1) log L
on a per-capita basis. On aggregate level, logY = 0 + 1 log L so that 1 = 1   1, as can be seen in table 10.
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(c) OLS GMP per capita
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(d) OLS GMP per capita (log)
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
x 10
7
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
x 10
10
#
4
 H
o
u
s
to
n
 
#
3
 C
h
ic
a
g
o
 
#
2
 L
o
s
 A
n
g
e
le
s
 
#
1
 N
e
w
 Y
o
rk
 
Employment
H
o
u
s
in
g
 (
in
 2
0
0
5
 U
S
D
)
#
4
 H
o
u
s
to
n
 
#
3
 C
h
ic
a
g
o
 
#
2
 L
o
s
 A
n
g
e
le
s
 
#
1
 N
e
w
 Y
o
rk
 
H
o
u
s
in
g
 (
in
 2
0
0
5
 U
S
D
)
(e) OLS Housing
10
5
10
6
10
7
10
8
10
9
10
10
10
11
#
3
2
3
 C
a
rs
o
n
 C
ity
, N
V
 
#
1
5
9
 L
a
re
d
o
, T
X
 
#
1
3
0
 N
a
p
le
s
, F
L
 
#
6
0
 N
o
rth
 P
o
rt, F
L
 
#
1
8
 S
t. L
o
u
is
 
#
2
 L
o
s
 A
n
n
g
e
le
s
 
#
1
 N
e
w
 Y
o
rk
 
Employment in log scale
H
o
u
s
in
g
 (
in
 2
0
0
5
 U
S
D
)
 
 
Theoretical
OLS
#
3
2
3
 C
a
rs
o
n
 C
ity
, N
V
 
#
1
5
9
 L
a
re
d
o
, T
X
 
#
1
3
0
 N
a
p
le
s
, F
L
 
#
6
0
 N
o
rth
 P
o
rt, F
L
 
#
1
8
 S
t. L
o
u
is
 
#
2
 L
o
s
 A
n
n
g
e
le
s
 
#
1
 N
e
w
 Y
o
rk
 
H
o
u
s
in
g
 (
in
 2
0
0
5
 U
S
D
)
(f) OLS Housing (log)
Figure 25.78
Regressand Parameter Value Intercept Employment log(Emp.) R2 R¯2 Fig.
GMP Actual Coefficient -6.492e+09 5.409e+04 .9717 .9716 25(a)
t-value -7.75 111.81
log(GMP) Actual Coefficient 8.960 1.117 .9528 .9527 25(b)
t-value 54.02 85.73
t-statistic 4.79 -4.81
log(GMP) Theoretical Coefficient 8.165 1.180 .9498 .9497 25(b)
t-value 47.74 87.79
GMP per capita Actual Coefficient 3.422e+04 2.522e-03 .1257 .1233 25(c)
t-value 56.69 7.23
log(GMP per capita) Actual Coefficient 8.960 .1173 .1821 .1799 25(d)
t-value 54.02 9.00
t-statistic 4.79 -4.81
log(GMP per capita) Theoretical Coefficient 8.165 .1800 .1302 .1278 25(d)
t-value 47.74 13.39
Housing Actual Coefficient -1.736e+09 8489 .9571 .9569 25(e)
t-value -9.88 84.60
log(Housing) Actual Coefficient 4.149 1.305 .8769 .8765 25(f)
t-value 11.98 47.81
t-statistic -4.57 4.59
log(Housing) Theoretical Coefficient 5.732 1.180 .8688 .8684 25(f)
t-value 16.03 41.88
Table 10. R¯2 is an adjusted value of R2. For t-value, the null is coefficient equals zero, whereas for
t-statistic, the null is coefficient equals theoretical value. Section 3.4.2 explains theoretical value.
3.3 Model
3.3.1 Spatial Production Economy
We construct an intercity general equilibrium model to seek a comprehensive explanation for all
the empirical findings in section 3.2. In particular we develop a production economy with three
commodities: composite goods, housing and leisure,14 and two types of agents: worker/consumer
and landlord.
There are I cities in the economy. Si residents live in city i, totalling S =
PI
i=1 S
i of urban
population nationwide. Each city has a demographic similar to the Alonso model (cf. Berliant and
Fujita [BF92]). See figure 26 for one example representation of agents involved in this production
14Alternatively, we can include capital goods but due to lack of data, we limit ourselves to three goods in this
economy.
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economy. Each city has a landlady who owns all the area H in city i. She is retired and lives
off her rental income riH, where ri marks the city’s rental rate (think of her as the first settler in
town or a developer). She is an immobile15 landlady and assumed to consume only composite
goods and leisure out of her one unit of allotted time.16 The remainder of the urban population
are mobile, active and identical workers/consumers who supply labor liR out of their one unit of
allotted time to produce a basket of goods ciR that includes all the goods and services other than
housing hiR and leisure (1   liR). Their consumption bundle xi and endowment ei are given by
xiR =
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
ciR
hiR
1   liR
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
; xiL =
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
ciL
hiL
1   liL
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
; eiR =
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
0
0
1
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
; eiL =
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
0
H
1
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
;
where subscript R denotes a representative working Resident and L denotes the Landlady.
On the production side, there are many firms in the city who employ one worker each and
produce the identical immobile commodity in a perfectly competitive environment. The produc-
tion plan 2i of a representative firm is given by
2i =
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
f (liF; h
i
F ; S
i)
 hiF
 liF
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
;
where liF denotes labor demand and h
i
F denotes land input used as a production site. We let the
production function f () depend on the city size to allow for externalities within the city such as
knowledge spillover effects or congestion to have an impact on productivity of individual firms
15 We assume that she cannot change her city of residence so that we can count the rental income toward GMP
where it is collected. Otherwise the rental income may be included in the city where she actually lives, which may
not be the city whose land she owns if she is an absentee landlady. However, we will not count her toward Si for
notational ease. We will return to the role of her location choice in section 3.4.2.
16 Assume that she lives in the city where she is a landlady but in the special lot designated for her outside H to
keep our analysis tractable. She needs to live in the city where she is a landlady because of footnote 15.
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in the same city.17
The intracity production economy in city i is identified by
Pi B

XiN; N; eiN

N2fR;Lg ; Y
i
F

;
where XiN B R
3
+ is a consumption set of a representative worker or the landlady, N is a complete
preorder over consumption set XiN, and Y
i
F is a production set of a representative firm given by
YiF B
n
2i = (ciF; h
i
F; l
i
F) 2 R3+ : ciF  f (liF; hiF; Si)
o
:
A feasible allocation in Pi is defined as follows:
Definition 3.3.1: Feasible Allocation
For given Si 2 [0;S], an allocation (xiR; xiL; 2i) 2 XiR  XiL  YiF in the intracity production economy Pi is
feasible iff
xiRS
i + xiL = 2
iSi + eiRS
i + eiL: (23)
To find GMP we need to compute the value of each commodity. Composite goods are mea-
sured in a number of baskets, housing in ft2 and leisure in hours for example. We cannot add
them together without weighing them with the price to derive a sensible measure of a city’s pro-
duction and earnings. Let pi B

1; ri; wi
0
be the price on a composite good, lot size and leisure.
We take composite goods as a nume´raire.18 There are two equivalent ways to define GMP. From
the production point of view, GMP Yi is defined by the total value of all the final goods and
services produced in the city, Yi = pi 

2i + eiRS
i + eiL

. From the consumers’ end, GMP is the sum
of all the expenditures on goods and services, Yi = pi 

xiRS
i + xiL

. They come out to the same
number due to Walras’ law.
Definition 3.3.2: GMP
17 Since we bundle all the goods in a single basket, there is no distinction between localization economies (agglom-
eration economies within an industry) and urbanization economies (agglomeration economies across the industries
within a city) in our model.
18Note that none of the commodities are tradable beyond the city border in this economy.
81
GMP in the intercity production economy Pi of size Si is identified by
Yi B pi 

2i + eiRS
i + eiL

= pi 

xiRS
i + xiL

: (24)
In application GDP does not count leisure time. We consume leisure for the price of the
opportunity cost (namely, lost wage), but in practice there is no explicit/accounting trace of
market transactions for the consumption of leisure to track down the leisure portion of GDP.
In particular we produce and consume wi
n
1   liR

Si +

1   liL
o
worth of leisure, but this part is
excluded from recorded GDP and by extension, from GMP as well. We use the data provided by
the US Bureau of Economic Analysis, and their figures are based on tax reports. We do not pay
tax on leisure consumption. Thus, we shall redefine Yi with only the first two entries and take
out the last entry (leisure)
Yi B
0BBBBBBBBB@
1
ri
1CCCCCCCCCA 
26666666664
0BBBBBBBBB@
ciR
hiR
1CCCCCCCCCASi +
0BBBBBBBBB@
ciL
hiR
1CCCCCCCCCA
37777777775 =
0BBBBBBBBB@
1
ri
1CCCCCCCCCA 
26666666664
0BBBBBBBBB@
f (liF; h
i
F ; S
i)
 hiF
1CCCCCCCCCASi +
0BBBBBBBBB@
0
0
1CCCCCCCCCASi +
0BBBBBBBBB@
0
H
1CCCCCCCCCA
37777777775 (25)
for statistical purposes.
As we understand from our empirical findings in section 3.2, Yi exhibits increasing returns
to scale Si. Then according to (25), at least one of f () or ri (possibly both) needs to be increasing
more than proportionately in Si to explain the actual GMP distribution as a function of the city
size.
To find the equilibrium price vector, first define i B (iR; 
i
L) as a vector of a representative
resident and landlady’s share of profit (iR; 
i
L 2 [0; 1] and iRSi + iL = 1).
Definition 3.3.3: Intracity Equilibrium
For a given i and ei, an intracity equilibrium in city i is a feasible allocation

xiR

; xiL

; 2i
 and price
vector pi such that
1. For N = R and L
pi
  xiN
  pi  eiN + iNpi
  2iSi: (26)
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2. For N = R and L
pi
  xiN  pi
  eiN + iNpi
  2iSi ) xi N xi; (27)
for any xiN 2 Xi.
3. For any 2i 2 YiF,
pi
  2i  pi  2i: (28)
To identify the equilibrium city size, let the intercity production economy P B

Pi; Si
I
i=1
; S

and define
Definition 3.3.4: Intercity Equilibrium
For a given ownership matrix

i
I
i=1
2 [0; 1]2I and endowment matrix

ei
I
i=1
2 Qi XiR  XiL, an inter-
city equilibrium in the production economy P is a list of a feasible allocation matrix

xiR

; xiL

; 2i
I
i=1
2Q
i

XiR  XiL  YiF

, price matrix

pi
I
i=1
2 R3I+ , and size distribution

Si
I
i=1
2 [0; S]I such that for any
Si > 0,
1.

xiR

; xiL

; 2i

; pi

is an intracity equilibrium for any city i.
2. For any i; j,
xiR
 R x jR

: (29)
3. Urban population adds up to X
i
Si = S: (30)
The second item (29) is due to free mobility of workers. This does not apply to landladies,
who are locked in their place of residence to keep the housing portion of GMP where it is
generated.
The equilibrium city-size distribution is the size component of an equilibrium in P and the
GMP distribution is (25) computed with an equilibrium in P.
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3.3.2 Application
To derive the exact distribution of GMP for empirical testing, consider an application of the
spatial production model developed in section 3.3.1 with production function and labor market
in the style of Eeckhout [Eec04] with the explicit presence of landladies (see figure 26 for a
schematic representation of the agents and commodities involved in this example). We will find
the analytical solution to the intercity equilibrium, from which we obtain the equilibrium GMP
distribution.
3.3.2.1 Intracity Equilibrium
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Figure 26. Commodity flow. Leisure is excluded
in accordance with the practical definition of GDP
adopted by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis.
To start off, pick any city i and consider its
intracity equilibrium. Firm’s production plan
is specified by
f

liF; h
i
F; S
i

= Aia+

Si

a 

Si

liF; (31)
where Ai is a stochastic citywide productiv-
ity parameter, a+()(> 0) measures the positive
externality shared among the firms operating
within the same city, and a ()(2 (0; 1)) mea-
sures congestion externality. City size is as-
sumed to raise the productivity of all the firms
operating in the city. Positive externality en-
hances with size (a0+() > 0). Each consumer
supplies liR units of gross labor but congestion externality adversely affects effective labor. The
fraction 1   a (Si) of labor will be spent on commuting rather than on production. The level of
reduction in effective labor aggravates with the size of a city (a0 () < 0). Firms do not pay for
the time lost in commuting and workers assume responsibility for the time cost of commuting.
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That is, firms will pay (ostensible) wages at the rate of !i only for the fraction of liR when their
worker is present at work, i.e., only for a 

Si

liR hours out of l
i
R. On an hourly basis, (effective)
wage is knocked down to wi

Si

B !ia 

Si

for each hour devoted for work, inclusive of com-
muting time.19 We will discuss the role of a landlady’s labor supply later. We assume that firms
do not require land as input in accordance with [Eec04] for simplicity, but land can readily be
incorporated into our production economy in section 3.3.1 as a factor of production.
Profit (28) turns into
pi  2i = Aia+

Si

a 

Si

liF   !ia 

Si

liF =
h
Bi

Si

  !ia 

Sit
i
liF; (32)
where Bi(Si) B Aia+

Si

a 

Si

. Since production function (31) exhibits constant returns to scale
in liF,
pi  2i = 0 (33)
in equilibrium (otherwise 2i violates profit maximiation condition (28)).20 Hence, if liF > 0, it
must follow that
Bi(Si) = !ia 

Si

(= wi

Si

) (34)
in equilibrium.
Note here that aggregate production may exhibit agglomerative economies due to positive
externality a+(), but internal scale economies are still absent because individual production func-
tion is linear in liF. For more on a dialectic between increasing and constant returns to scale, see
Rossi-Hansberg and Wright [RHW07].
Next order of business is the consumers. Represent R in Pi by
uR

ciR; h
i
R; l
i
R

=  log ciR +  log h
i
R +  log

1   liR

; (35)
19 Hence, the opportunity cost of leisure is wi

Si

rather than !i.
20 Constant returns to scale implies 2i 2 YiF ) 2i 2 YiF for any   0. If pi 2i > 0, profit still improves with 22i 2 YiF.
If pi  2i < 0, profit still improves with 02i 2 YiF.
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where ; ;  > 0, and assume  +  +  = 1 for simplicity. According to the feasibility condition
(23) household income is given by pi  eiR + iRpi  2iSi. Since firms earn zero profit (33), household
income simplifies to labor income pi  eiR = wi

Si

 1 alone, with which to buy composite goods
ciR, housing h
i
R and leisure

1   liR

at the price of pi =

1; ri; wi

. Marshallian demand is
xiR

pi;wi

=
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
ciR

pi;wi

hiR

pi;wi

1   liR

pi;wi

1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
=
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
wi

Si

wi

Si

=ri

1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
=
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
Bi

Si

Bi

Si

=ri

1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
(36)
The second equality holds as a result of profit maximization (28) and its consequence (34). Labor
supply liR of a typical household will be 1    =  + . Material balance (23) requires that
1   liR

Si + 1   liL =  liFSi + 1  Si + 1. Since utility maximization for the retired landlady (27)
results in liL

= 0 in this economy (see (39) below), liR

= liF
, which furthermore implies that the
equilibrium production plan will be
2i

=
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
f

liF; h
i
F; S
i

0
 liF
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
=
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
( + )Bi

Si

0
 ( + )
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
: (37)
Turning to the landlady, represent L in Pi by
uL

ciL; h
i
L; l
i
L

= ciL1fliL=0g

liL

; (38)
where 1fliL=0g() is an indicator function that takes the value of one when liL = 0 and zero otherwise.
Since she is retired, any hour of labor liL > 0 will instantly push her utility level down to zero
regardless of an increment in her utility level from an increased consumption of composite goods
financed through her labor income.21 That is, her utility level is nonnegative over the plane liL = 0
21Alternatively, we could model her as an active worker, which complicates our notations without much gain in
insights.
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in R3+ and zero elsewhere. Once again, since the share of zero profit (33) earns her nothing, the
budget constraint (26) implies that the landlady’s income is pi  eiL = riH+wi

Si

. Her Marshallian
demand is
xiL

pi;wi

=
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
ciL

pi;wi

hiL

pi;wi

1   liL

pi;wi

1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
=
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
riH
0
1
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
: (39)
Then residential utility maximization (36), profit maximization (37) and landlady’s utility
maximiation (39) rewrite feasibility condition (23) as
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
Bi

SiR

Bi

SiR

=ri
1   ( + )
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
Si +
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
riH
0
1
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
=
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
( + )Bi

Si

0
 ( + )
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
Si +
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
0
0
1
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
Si +
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
0
H
1
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
: (40)
from which, along with the first order condition (34), we can find the equilibrium price vector in
city i as
pi

=
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
1
ri
wi
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
=
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
1
Bi

Si

Si=H
Bi

Si

1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
(41)
(see figure 26 to track the commodity flow in equilibrium over Pi). Observe that the rent ri goes
up if 1) city i draws a good technological shock Ai, 2) positive externality a+

Si

intensifies, or
3) city i becomes less crowded (a 

Si

). Likewise the leisure becomes expensive for the same
reasons. Reasons 2) and 3) are triggered by urban growth, whereas reason 1) is independent of
Si.
It is worth pointing out that our economy makes a judicious use of limited labor. The working
population is capped at S. The intracity equilibrium and more noticeably, the intercity equilib-
rium, allocate more people to a city with a good production environment and pull back labor
from a city of low productivity. Indirect utility is increasing in Bi

Si

in equilibrium. Migration
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dynamics are such that there is an inflow when Bi

Si

is above the national average and vice
versa if it is below. The economy has an auto-rerouting mechanism built into it if population
allocation ever deviates from the equilibrium, by incentivizing people to move to a productive
city.22
With feasibility condition (40) and the equilibrium price (41) we obtain GMP (24) in equilib-
rium as follows:
Yi = pi 

xiR

+ xiL

= ( + )B

Si

Si + B

Si

Si|                            {z                            }
Reported portion of GMP Yi (25)
+B

Si
 
Si + 1

= (1 + )B

Si

Si + B

Si

:
(42)
On the second line in (42) are the value of composite goods, housing and leisure for each. Only
the first two are included in the actual GMP.
Equilibrium GMP (42) leads to the following:
Proposition 3.3.1: Citywide Scale Economies in an Intracity Economy
Consider the equilibrium in an intracity economy Pi. The reported portion of GMP Yi exhibits increasing
returns to scale in size Si iff Bi

Si

Si exhibits increasing returns to scale in Si.
Proof. Apparent from (42). 
In reference to section 3.2.3, observed data seem to suggest that positive externality does out-
strip negative externality. However, as we will see in proposition 3.3.2, citywide scale economies
in intercity equilibrium will be positive without assuming increasing returns to scale on Bi

Si

Si.
3.3.2.2 Intercity Equilibrium
To find the intercity equilibrium in definition 3.3.4, rewrite indifference principle (29) in terms of
a utility function (35) so that indirect utility u

xiR

= u

x jR

for any i and j with Si; S j > 0. This
22 The allocation of labor is still not efficient though, due to externalities.
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leads to
Bi

Si
 
Si
 
 = B j

Si
 
S j
 
 C K; (43)
where K is a location-invariant constant. According to (42), GMP is Yi = (1+ )K

Si
 
+1 +K

Si
 

and the reported portion of GMP will be
Yi = ( + 2)K

Si
 
+1 (44)
in the neighborhood of the equilibrium size, which breaks down into composite goods produc-
tion/consumption ( + )K

Si
 
+1 and housing production/consumption of K

Si
 
+1. Now we
have
Proposition 3.3.2: Citywide Scale Economies in an Intercity Economy
If an intercity economy P is in equilibrium, the reported portion of GMP Yi exhibits increasing returns to
size in the neighborhood of equilibrium size Si.
Proof. Immediate from (44). 
In comparison to proposition 3.3.1 it is curious that we have to assume Bi

Si

Si to be increas-
ing returns to scale only in Pi but not in P. The short answer to this enigma is that free mobility
puts the city size where scale economies are in effect. For illustrative purposes, assume that
a+

Si

a 

Si

takes the form

Si
(Si)
. Note that proposition 3.3.1 specifically requires 

Si

> 0 in
Pi but proposition 3.3.2 does not because perfect mobility will bring 

Si

above zero anyway.
Now assume that P is in equilibrium. Suppose that in some city i, size Si rose by one (call this
new resident Axel). In this case, housing consumption will be reduced in the city because res-
idents have to make room for Axel’s house out of a fixed supply of H, and he also exacerbates
congestion in the city. However, since P is in equilibrium, reduction in utility level by curtailed
housing consumption needs to be offset by either ciR or l
i
R in compliance with utility equalization
(29). Since liR is independent of size (i.e., leisure consumption does not and cannot accommodate
the change to the city residents introduced by Axel), compensation must be made through in-
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creased consumption in ciR alone. Then the question is: Can he produce enough composite goods
to leave everyone in city i on the same indifference curve?
It is the answer to this question that makes P increasing returns to scale in size in equilibrium.
The marginal rate of substitution between ciR and h
i
R is


ciR
hiR
baskets for each ft2. Now, Axel
carves
@hiR
@Si
=
hiR
Si
ft2 from every resident’s lot in the city. Thus, each city resident needs to have0BBBB@ ciRhiR
1CCCCA hiRSi = ciR 1Si more baskets to keep to the countrywide utility level (or else the current
allocation will not be an equilibrium). Then the addition of Axel into the city needs to raise the
individual production of composite goods as follows:
@ f

 ; Si

@Si
=


f

 ; Si
 1
Si
) 

Si

Ai

Si
(Si) 1
=


Ai

Si
(Si) 1
) 

Si

=


(> 0):
(45)
23 If not, for example, if 

Si

<

 , then Axel cannot make up for the lost individual housing
unit by producing more composite goods through enhanced pooled production externality net
of the congestion externality. The knowledge spillover effect he brings in (less the congestion
externality he exerts) is not enough to render the dwindled housing consumption tolerable for
the current residents. In this case, city i is better off bumping him out, i.e., it should reduce Si,
contradicting the fact that P is in equilibrium. And vice versa, city i should be larger if 

Si

>

 .
Everyone welcomes Axel and wants more residents to move in in this case. Thus, free mobility
arbitrages the gap between externality component 

Si

and countrywide constant  and forces
the city to operate in the domain where scale economies are present (otherwise, there will still be
an in- or out-flow of people). Note that utility equalization (29) only applies to cities with Si > 0.
If a city’s aggregate production function does not exhibit increasing returns to scale anywhere over
0 < Si  S, then the city will not survive and turns rural in the end. In such a location, 

Si

<


23We took the landlady out of equation because her marginal rate of substitution between composite goods and
housing is zero. Cutbacks in housing lot do not affect her at all due to her preferences (38).
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and all the residents will be drained off to other cities until Si becomes zero.24 Thus, increasing
returns to scale at the aggregate level are an eligibility requirement to be listed under MSA. See
appendix A.8 for further discussion on scale economies in P as opposed to Pi.
It is crucial that we unbundle housing consumption from the composite good. If we include
housing as part of a composite good, per capita consumption level, and consequently individual
production levels will be the same across the cities because the consumption of leisure is the
same everywhere and free mobility guarantees an equal utility level. Then aggregate production
level becomes directly proportional to the city size. Alternatively, we can unbundle the composite
good and create markets for many commodities. In that case we may have increasing returns
to scale in production but the price of individual commodities tend to negate the variations in
output levels and GMP will be only proportional to the city size. A positive technological shock
enhances the production, which reduces the equilibrium price in a perfectly competitive market.
Thus, the value of the output will exhibit constant returns to scale, which is not compatible
with our findings in section 3.2.3. We will have to forgo the assumption of perfectly competitive
market in this case.
3.3.3 Distribution of GMP
Eeckhout [Eec04] has shown that Si follows the lognormal distribution using the central limit
theorem. The equilibrium size of a city can be written as a sum of the log of error terms over
time. The city size depends on the cumulative effect of multiplicative nature rather than of
additive nature [LSA01], leading to the lognormal distribution (see appendix A.9 for details). In
particular log

Si

 N

S; 2S

. In conjunction with (44) we obtain the following:
24 Notice that as the expenditure share of housing  increases, it becomes harder and harder to meet the condition
(45) and more cities will be abandoned and fewer cities will survive. As we will see later, (46) confirms that a rise in
 will skew the distribution.
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Proposition 3.3.3: GMP Distribution
The reported portion of GMP follows a lognormal distribution:
logY  N
0BBBB@  + 1
!
s + log( + 2)K;
( 


+ 1
!
s
)21CCCCA (46)
There is a log-linear relationship between GMP and city size (44) and city size follows a
lognormal distribution. Naturally, GMP also follows a lognormal distribution by extension. The
variance of log(Y) is inflated by  + 1 due to citywide scale economies (proposition 3.3.2). This
observation is consistent with our findings in section 3.2.2. GMP (in log scale) spreads further
than its city-size counterpart in P.
Eeckhout [Eec04] also establishes the Gibrat’s law
d logSit
dt   (t denotes time. See appendix A.9).
Then from (44),
d logYit
dt
=
 


+ 1
!
d log Sit
dt

 


+ 1
!
it;
where it is an i.i.d. random variable. Thus GMP also follows the Gibrat’s law. Note that variation
in Yi is inflated by  + 1 and this is coherent with our empirical findings in section 3.4.1.
3.4 Empirical Implementation
3.4.1 Distribution of GMP
We will put proposition 3.3.3 to an empirical test in this section. First, rewrite the GMP distri-
bution (46) as logY  N(; 2). The maximum likelihood estimator of (46) is ˆ =
P
logYi
N and
ˆ2 =
P
(logYi ˆ)
N
2
: We report our estimations in table 11 with supporting density plots in figure 27.
Housing portion of GMP, K

Si
 
+1, is also available and they are expected to follow the lognor-
mal distribution as well.
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(c) CDF of GMP
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Figure 27.93
Employment GMP Housing
Data Size I 366 366 323
Censored (Unreported Cities) 0% 0% 11.75%
Censored (Unreported Value) 0% 0% 13.87%
Estimated Mean ˆS, ˆ 12.68 23.13 20.66
Estimated Variance ˆ2S, ˆ
2 1.128 1.478 2.133
Theoretical Variance

ˆ
ˆ + 1

ˆS
2
– 1.571 1.571
Log Likelihood/I .2709 .2370 .1968
Kolomogorov-Smirnov Statistic .1122 .1032 .1031
Table 11.
The overall fit is not too far off. The maximum discrepancy between the empirical and esti-
mated CDF (Kolomogorov-Smirnov statistic) is .1032. We are more than certain that the fit would
improve if we used an inclusive data set. Due to truncation to the left of the distribution, the
tail end of the distribution does not extend as far as the theory predicts to the left. At this point
we do not have GMP data for smaller cities. Hopefully GMP on micropolitan statistical areas
or census-designated places will become available someday but we will settle for MSA data for
now.
As we will see in section 3.4.2, the ratio between  and  is .1800. Following the GMP dis-
tribution (46), the theoretically expected value of 2 is (1:180ˆ2S)
2 = 1:571 (cf. theoretical variance
in table 11). Our expected variance in GMP computed from the expected expenditure shares 
and  and estimated variance 2 in employment is eerily close to the actual variance in GMP (we
missed the actual value only by 5.86%). This confirms the validity of the form (46) along with the
selection of the utility and production functions in section 3.3.2. On the other hand, the variance
on housing is lager than the theoretical value by 35.86%. We will explore the cause of the large
gap in housing in section 3.4.2.
3.4.2 Scale Economies
According to (44), the ratio between GMP and housing is +2 to . The actual ratio is $1:162e+13
to $1:603e+ 12 among the MSA’s, indicating that the expenditure share  of the housing sector is
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13.23%.25 Hence, the expected ratio ˆˆ = :1800. Taking a log of (44),
logYi = log( + 2)K +
 


+ 1
!
log

Si

= log( + 2)K + 1:180 log

Si

:
The actual value of the coefficient is 1.117 in table 10 rather than 1.180, meaning that our model
overshoots the coefficient by only 5.64% (or, the economy is off where it should be by 5.64%). The
housing portion of GMP log K

Si
 
+1 also shares the same coefficient in (44). Here the predicted
value comes short of the actual value by 10.59%. The large discrepancy may be because of the
censored data,26 or the landlords’ or developers’ registered addresses, which may be different
from the city where they have their real estate. The fact that imputed rent is excluded and
that houses usually last longer than the duration of a fiscal year exacerbates the deviation even
further.
3.5 Conclusion and Extensions
We have discovered that the GMP distribution shares the same pattern as the city-size distri-
bution, and we sought a systematic illustration of how our local economies are related to their
employment and output levels on a national scale. Proposition 3.3.2 further revealed that GMP
grows more than 1% against 1% growth in employment. Large cities make up for an exceeding
share of GDP and they do so more than their city size alone can account for. Consequently, due
to agglomeration economies of GMP in employment, the GMP distribution is even more skewed
than the city-size distribution.
We constructed a production economy model that endogenously gives rise to agglomeration
economies in equilibrium. The interplay between externalities and housing consumption drives
the cities to operate at the size where increasing returns to scale are present. Empirical testing
25Note that GDP includes real estate sales and excludes imputed rent. Thus, the figure does not necessarily represent
the expenditure share in a particular year.
26 Housing output values are not reported for all MSA’s and the missed portion is not negligible. For example,
housing sector in Dallas (rank #4 in employment) is censored out of the data. However, these censored values are
included in the nationwide aggregate.
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verifies our model prediction; however, the result could be made better off. Due to data trunca-
tion, our predicted distribution does not trace the lower end of the distribution well. Ideally, we
would like to test our prediction with an exhaustive data set, which, for the moment, does not
exist yet.
Our objective was to explain the GMP distribution in a consistent manner. As far as we know
this is the first attempt to analyze GMP as a distribution. Along the way, we have left several
prospects for future work. We assumed a single-input production function. Local output may
well be affected by capital, educational attainment, location of the city, access to a rich labor pool,
or urban infrastructure, which, obviously vary from city to city. We also packed the consumption
goods other than housing and leisure into a single basket. In reality a city comes with various
industries. Some of them may exhibit increasing returns to scale and some may not both within
and across the industries. Cross-sectional GMP analysis is called for to decode the internal
workings of local economies that, on aggregate, exhibits increasing returns to scale and a fat-tail
distribution. Lastly, we assumed that all the goods are immobile. Data reported by the Bureau
of Economic Analysis are based on tax filed in each MSA. As such, the scope of GMP matches
the range of production in MSA, but it does not necessarily match the range of consumption in
the city. The openness of a spatial economy may be addressed by adding shipping firms to the
production economy. One way to do so is to assume that a shipping firm takes composite goods
in city i as input and ”produces” the same composite good in city j as output, in less than a
one-to-one ratio to reflect shipping charges of iceberg form.
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A Appendix
A.1 A Model from the Literature Modified to Include Insurance
A.1.1 Notation
We use the model of Eeckhout [Eec04] as the basis for the analysis because it is explicit about con-
sumer behavior, in the form of an optimization problem, as well as endogenous urban variables,
namely local wages and land rents.
The original model is specified as follows. For complete detail, see Eeckhout ([Eec04], pp.
1445-1446). In general, there is a large number of cities and a continuum of identical consumers.
Each city produces the same commodity using labor and a constant returns to scale technology.
The production function is dependent on a city-wide shock and on a positive agglomeration
externality that is a function of city population. There is also a negative congestion externality
that is a function of city population and that only affects consumers. On net, the random shocks
to productivity cause some, but not all, population to move each period so as to equalize utility
across cities in equilibrium.
Time is discrete and indexed by t. The set of cities is indexed by i 2 I. Consumers are infinitely
lived and identical. In city i at time t, consumption good is ci;t, housing or land consumption is
hi;t whereas leisure is 1   li;t for labor supply li;t 2 [0; 1]. Utility for a consumer in city i at time t
is Cobb-Douglas:
u(ci;t; hi;t; li;t) = ci;th

i;t(1   li;t)1  
with ; ;  +  2 (0; 1).
Production is constant returns to scale. The measure of population in city i at time t is Si;t.
Let Ai;t be the technological productivity parameter of city i at time t. This parameter follows the
law of motion:
Ai;t = Ai;t 1(1 + i;t) (47)
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where i;t is the exogenous technological shock to city i at time t. It is assumed that i;t is i.i.d.
with mean 0, symmetrically distributed, and satisfies 1 + i;t > 0. The positive local externality
(spillover) function is given by a+(Si;t) > 0, where a0+(Si;t) > 0. The marginal product of a worker
in city i at time t is given by
yi;t = Ai;ta+(Si;t)
For prices, let the consumption good be nume´raire, the price of housing or land in city i at
time t be pi;t, and let the wage in city i at time t be wi;t. The local negative externality or congestion
function is given by a (Si;t) 2 [0; 1], where a0 (Si;t) < 0. The optimization problem of a consumer
in city i at time t is:
max
fci;t;hi;t;li;tg
ci;th

i;t(1   li;t)1  
subject to
ci;t + pi;thi;t  wi;tLi;t
where wi;t = Ai;ta+(Si;t) and Li;t = a (Si;t)li;t. Total land or housing in a city is H.
Using the first order conditions from this optimization problem and market clearance, equi-
librium (denoted by asterisks) in city i at time t as a function of population Si;t can be found:
pi;t =
Ai;ta+(Si;t)a (Si;t)Si;t
H
wi;t = Ai;ta+(Si;t)
ci;t = Ai;ta+(Si;t)a (Si;t)
hi;t =
H
Si;t
li;t =  + 
The last equation in particular, indicating that labor supply is independent of population, is
an artifact of the Cobb-Douglas specification.
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Substituting back into the utility function, indirect equilibrium utility as a function of popu-
lation u(Si;t) can be written as
u(Si;t) = [Ai;t  a+(Si;t)a (Si;t)]S i;t H[1      ]1   (48)
Under free mobility of consumers, indirect utility is equated across cities in each time period,
determining their populations as a function of their productivity and their realized history of
shocks, summarized by Ai;t. Instantaneous utility is constant over both time and location in
equilibrium. Again using Eeckhout’s notation, call this instantaneous utility level U.
A.1.2 Insurance
Let the discount factor be denoted by  2 (0; 1]. In correspondence with the assumption of
complete capital markets, it is assumed that all consumers can borrow or lend at rate 1   1. The
consumer optimization problem (at time 0) becomes:
max
fci;t;hi;t;li;tg
1X
t=1
t  ci;thi;t(1   li;t)1  
subject to
1X
t=1
t  (ci;t + pi;thi;t) 
1X
t=1
t  wi;tLi;t
As stated by Eeckhout, the problem reduces to the one period optimization problem if there
are no insurance or futures markets. Formally, there should be an expectation in the objective
function and a requirement that the budget constraint hold for every state of nature. However,
this is omitted in the literature since the problem is reduced to a static optimization problem
where the state of nature is observed before consumers make their choices.
There are several important points to be made at this juncture. First, it is useful to imagine
the consumers stepping back at t = 0 and making decisions about their cities of residence and
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their consumption bundles for the entire time stream of their infinite lives, contingent on state
realizations at each time. Second, and more important, it does not matter which interpretation of
the model one employs. Specifically, resources can be transferred across states of the world (at any
given time) in one or more of several ways (insurance, self-insurance, or futures contracts). In
the end, what a consumer is choosing is their residence and consumption bundle for every time
and for every possible state of the world, optimizing utility subject to the budget constraint. The
state of the world at time t affects the optimization problem through the prices, pi;t and wi;t, and
income (through a (Si;t) and Li;t) only. These variables depend on Ai;t both directly and indirectly,
the latter because Si;t depends on Ai;t in equilibrium. The state of the world at time t does not
enter into the consumer optimization problem otherwise. For example, it does not enter into
the utility function. We could index these prices and incomes by the state of the world, but that
would only serve to complicate notation.
As already mentioned, what will matter are only the lifetime choices of residence and con-
sumption bundles, contingent on the state of the world in each period. The method used to
actually implement them, via transfers across states in a time period as opposed to across time
periods, does not matter; there are many possibilities. With complete futures markets, at time
t = 0 the consumers can sell their labor in every future time period and state, buying con-
sumption good and housing in every future time period and state. With insurance markets, at
t = 0 the consumers can buy actuarially fair insurance against price and income changes. With
self-insurance, they can commit to a plan of borrowing and saving under all possible scenarios,
namely realizations of states in each time period.
To get the basic idea across, in the next subsection we show how insurance would work from
the beginning when all cities have the same initial state (productivity) and population. This
yields no movement at any time in equilibrium. In the next subsection, we discuss how to extend
this so that insurance can begin from equilibrium of the model at any time t. From that time on,
there is no consumer movement unless the insurance is switched off.
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Insurance when the initial state is the same for all cities
To illustrate the ideas behind insurance, we begin with an example where all cities start with the
same state at time 0 and consumers insure from then on.
For notational purposes, let S¯ be the mean population of cities, that is S¯ =
P
i2I Si;t
jIj , where j I j
is the cardinality of the set I. Let A0 = Ai;0 denote the common initial technology level for all the
identical cities before the process begins. Let Si;0 = S¯ for all cities i, so they all have the same
initial population. We assume that
U = u(S¯) = [A0  a+(S¯)a (S¯)]S¯ H[1      ]1  
Thus, we assume for illustrative purposes that the initial configuration of shock A0 and uniform
population distribution S¯ generate the instantaneous equilibrium utility. This is to get the idea
across; in the next section, we will show how to start insurance from equilibrium at an arbitrary
given time. In either case, no consumer movement will occur once insurance begins.
With insurance, self-insurance, or a futures market (or some combination of all 3), we propose
the following equilibrium solution for all cities i and times t:
p¯i;t =
A0a+(S¯)a (S¯)S¯
H
w¯i;t = A0a+(S¯)
c¯i;t = A0a+(S¯)a (S¯)
h¯i;t =
H
S¯
l¯i;t =  + 
In other words, this is the allocation generated by a constant, over both time and state, allo-
cation with a uniform distribution of consumers. By construction, it generates the same instanta-
neous utility stream for all consumers in all cities and in all times as both the initial distribution
and the equilibrium studied by Eeckhout.
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But how does this work in a pragmatic sense? Regarding futures markets, each consumer
works the same hours, independent of state. If the state realization is good, i.e. if the consumer
is in city i at time 0 and Ai;t > A0, income in excess of A0a+(S¯)  ( + ) is paid to the market.
If the state realization is bad, then the consumer receives income from the market, smoothing
consumption. Under self-insurance, the consumer commits to a plan of saving income in a good
state, and withdrawing from savings or borrowing in a bad state, thus smoothing consumption.
The banks know that E(Ai;t) = A0, so they are willing to lend. Under mutual insurance, the
same type of idea, with commitment, has consumers who are in cities with good states at time t
contributing to an insurance pool, and those in cities with bad states receiving payments from an
insurance pool. If the number of cities is large, the law of large numbers implies that the mutual
insurance pool is solvent.
It is interesting to note that the phenomenon we describe is something like another manifes-
tation of Starrett’s spatial impossibility theorem (see Mills [Mil67], Starrett [Sta78], Fujita [Fuj86],
and Fujita and Thisse [FT02] (chapter 2.3), though here markets are incomplete due to the pres-
ence of unpriced local externalities, both positive (a+) and negative (a ). In particular, we obtain
a uniform distribution of economic activity, in spite of the violation of one of the hypotheses of
the Theorem, namely perfect and complete markets. It is well-known (from these cites) that the
hypotheses of Starrett’s Theorem are sufficient but not necessary for the conclusion, namely the
lack of agglomeration.
In summary, the equilibrium time path of utility for every consumer is the same, and constant,
under insurance and under the equilibrium that generates movement and eventually becomes
lognormal. At the very least, a discussion of why the latter equilibrium is selected should be
offered in the literature.
With any moving cost, the insurance or futures market equilibrium (the one denoted with
bars) clearly dominates the path with asterisks, the one put forth in the literature. Given a choice
between moving along the equilibrium path or insuring at t = 0, each consumer will individually
choose to insure.
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A second, and perhaps more reasonable possibility, is that consumers observe Ai;t imperfectly
when they make their location decisions each period. In that case as well, the consumers will
insure rather than move, since they are risk averse. This can be seen in equation (48). When
consumers cannot perfectly observe Ai;t when optimizing, equilibrium expected utility will vary
in proportion to E(Ai;t).
Insurance starting when the state is an equilibrium at a given time
The preceding subsection was provided to give intuition. However, it has drawbacks in terms of
commitment on the part of consumers if they use mutual insurance at each given time, and on
the part of banks and consumers at time 0 if the consumers use self-insurance. Moreover, there is
a strong assumption that at time 0, A0 is the same across cities, each city has the same population
S¯, and this combination produces the instantaneous equilibrium utility level. Here we discuss
how to dispense with some of these assumptions.
Suppose that we start running the model without insurance, so that consumers are generally
moving around, and stop it at some arbitrary time t. At this time, the instantaneous utility level of
each consumer is, of course, U. Consider a consumer in city i and the possibility of self-insurance.
At that point, the productivity parameter in the city is Ai;t, and everyone knows from equation
(47) that for t0 > t, E(Ai;t0) = Ai;t. So if the consumers in that city freeze their consumption bundle
at whatever it is at that time, and commit to staying in that city and consuming that consumption
bundle forever through a plan of borrowing and saving, they will obtain utility level U in each
period. This exploits the law of large numbers over time.
Mutual insurance, exploiting the law of large numbers over space at a given time, is more
interesting. Pick an arbitrary time t and freeze all the consumers in their equilibrium locations
as well as their consumption bundles. All consumers obtain utility U in this situation at time t.
Now consider what would happen if they maintain the same location and consumption bundle
in time t + 1. Given equation (47), the surplus or deficit in total wage payments for city i relative
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to the benchmark inherited from the previous period t is
i;t+1  Ai;t  a+(Si;t)  ( + )  Si;t (49)
Thus, to ensure that this system of mutual insurance across cities is solvent at time t + 1, it is
necessary that X
i2I
1
j I j  i;t+1  Ai;t  a+(Si;t)  ( + )  Si;t = 0
Although this cannot be assured for finite j I j, we can see that as the number of cities j I j tends
to infinity, the limiting result is a consequence of a law of large numbers with weights given by
1
jIj  Ai;t  a+(Si;t)  ( + )  Si;t.
Since the support of the random variable 1 + i;t is contained in (0; 2), equation (47) implies
that the size of Ai;t at given time t can be bounded over i by 2tAi;0. Since Ai;t and Si;t are positively
related, there is also a bound for Si;t and thus for the continuous function a+(Si;t) for fixed t over i.
There is an extensive literature on law of large numbers for sums of weighted random variables.
Our framework would fit, for example, in Cabrera and Volodin (2005, Corollary 1).
Notice that there is no commitment required under mutual insurance beyond the next period.
So it can be switched on and off as desired, with no consumer movement when it is on, and
movement when it is off. If insurance is carried on to period t + 2, then expression (49) updated
to time t + 2 represents the change in the surplus or deficit in total wage payments for city i
relative to time t + 1, so solvency at time t + 2 requires that these changes sum to zero across
cities.
There is a subtle issue of commitment relevant to mutual insurance that is not as subtle for
self-insurance. An interesting strategy for consumers is to insure for the first period, wait for
uncertainty in the first period to be resolved, then pick a winner (a location where Ai;t+1 > Ai;t),
move there, and then reinsure. If a long term commitment to insurance is required, then of
course (similar to self-insurance) this strategy is not possible. Alternatively, if such commitment
is not desirable, we could make an assumption about off the equilibrium path beliefs. That is,
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we could assume that if a consumer moves to a winning location, that person thinks that others
will also follow this strategy, driving down instantaneous utility until it is again equalized across
locations. Thus, this strategy does not do better than insuring in every period.
Extensions: Partial Insurance and Moving Cost
Before discussing partial insurance, it is useful at this point to make some remarks and to give
some detail about equilibrium in Eeckhout’s model with moving costs. In such a model, equilib-
ria do not feature equalization of utility across locations, and this makes matters more compli-
cated. We assume that a moving cost, if non-zero, is paid in terms of the nume´raire consumption
good. We call it M  0. The main fact we need is that the explicit utility function is strongly
monotonic in consumption good.
In this framework, we assume that before uncertainty is realized in a given period, each
consumer must choose between a commitment to stay in their current location (and possibly
insure against the uncertainty) or to move (after the realizations of all shocks that period are
known to everyone).
First, consider the situation where the initial distribution generates the same instantaneous
utility, independent of location. (With moving cost, this might not happen, but it is useful for
thinking about the problem.) Then we will consider the situation where the initial distribution
does not generate the same instantaneous utility.
The first claim we make is that under these conditions, for fixed positive M, every consumer
will unilaterally decide to commit to stay and insure. The reason is that for Eeckhout’s arguments
to work, uncertainty must be arbitrarily small. This is made explicit p. 1447 of Eeckhout (2004),
where "i;t is written as an increasing function of i;t, and asymptotic statements as "i;t ! 0 are
used to derive Gibrat’s law. So for any fixed M > 0, we can find sufficiently small "i;t, and thus
i;t (or its support) so that each consumer would find it more costly to move than to insure.
Thus, the potential gain from moving will be less than the cost, namely M. If consumers have
heterogeneous moving costs, as long as there isn’t an atom of consumers at zero moving cost,
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as the random variables representing the shocks become small, the measure of consumers who
prefer to move rather than insure will tend to zero.
Clearly, in the original equilibrium with consumer movement, the measure of consumers who
actually move between periods to equate utility across locations is relatively small. But given the
last argument, no individual will want to be among the movers. And over time, the social cost
of moving will add up.
Given that nobody chooses to move, we can next calculate the amount of insurance they will
purchase. Since Si;t+1 = Si;t, we can calculate from (48) and (47):
Eu(Ai;t+1 j Ai;t, Si;t) = E([fAi;t(1 +   i;t+1)g  a+(Si;t)a (Si;t)][Si;t] H[1      ]1  )
where 1  is the percentage of insurance purchased. By concavity, Ef(1+ i;t+1)g is maximized
at  = 0, so everyone purchases full insurance. Partial insurance is not a feature of equilibrium.
Finally, consider the case where the initial indirect utility levels are not equalized across loca-
tions in equilibrium due to the moving cost. In fact, due to costly mobility, the utility difference
in terms of nume´raire cannot exceed M, for otherwise consumers would move to the location
with higher gross utility (as it exactly compensates for the moving cost). But since consumers
can look ahead, they realize that this is not just a one period difference in utility levels. In other
words, after sinking moving cost this period, next period it is expected that the higher utility
location will yield the same utility (for example, by fully insuring) without having to pay the
moving cost. So more people will move there this period. The present discounted value of the
utility difference will be at most the moving cost. So in the first period under consideration,
people might move. But after that, the population distribution will be stable, and everyone in all
locations will fully insure for the same reason as given above.
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A.2 Positive Transport Costs
Before turning to the details of our simulations, we first summarize our conclusions. Table 12
reports the statistics from our simulations. Typically, in equilibrium, there will be more than one
city producing the same commodity to serve nearby cities. Whereas both the lognormal and GEV
distributions track the simulated data well, the results are inconclusive concerning which of the
two distributions better explains the economy with multiple production sites. The KS statistic
is small for both distributions; AIC and BIC are lower for the lognormal distribution when the
iceberg transportation cost is large, but in the end the differences are small.
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Now let us turn to the details of the simulations. We have 10 industries with 30 potential
production sites each, so there are 300 potential city locations lined up on a circle. Transportation
cost is of the iceberg form. In particular, we ship out 1.01, 1.05, or 1.1 units of commodity and
an immediate neighbor on the circle receives 1 unit of it. Shipment cost grows with distance
traveled. City residents purchase goods from the city that quotes the smallest delivered price
within each industry. Everything else is the same as the basic model we have described.
The results from our simulations depart from the results from the basic model in two ways.
As is the case for the basic model, high productivity reduces the mill price. However, it is
not practical to serve the entire population from a single city just because the city is the most
productive in the industry; delivered price grows with distance. Rather, a couple of cities will
coexist within the same industry to serve the cities in close proximity to each of them. Also,
surviving cities are not necessarily the most productive in the industry. It depends not only on a
city’s own productivity but also on the size and productivity of close neighbors.
For the 300 locations, we mark an industry by j = 1; :::; 10 and a location block of 10 cities
by i = 1; :::; 30. On a circle, we have city (i; j) = (1; 1) located next to (1; 2), next to (1; 3) and
so on. Then, next to (1; 10) we have (2; 1). As we travel along the circle in this way, we will
eventually reach (30; 10), whose next neighbor is (1; 1), completing the circle. Figure 28 is a
schematic representation of the arrangement of cities so that we can illustrate how the model
works. A circle with 300 dots would be difficult to interpret, so instead we give the industry on
the horizontal axis and the location block on the vertical axis.
Figure 28(a) represents the size of the random productivity draw A, where a larger dot rep-
resents a larger value of A. We shall use this single draw of the random variable for subsequent
illustrations. In figure 28(b) we represent the equilibrium city-size distribution for a transport
cost of 1.01, where a larger dot means a larger equilibrium population and no dot means the
area is rural. Such a small transport cost causes only a minor change from our basic model. Take
industry j = 8 for example. The most productive city is (i; j) = (6; 8). This would be the city
that survives in the absence of any transport cost. City (6; 8) still survives and produces most
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Figure 28. Missing dots indicate rural areas in figures 28(b) and 28(c).
of commodity j = 8 when we throw in a minimal shipment fee. However, there are some other
cities, such as (25; 8), that also engage in production to serve local markets. City (25; 8) undercuts
the delivered price of city (6; 8) for nearby cities. Indeed, shipment from (6; 8) to (25; 8) would
require impractical 189 steps.
As we raise transport cost, a qualitatively different city-size distribution emerges in equilib-
rium. Own productivity level becomes less pertinent and the size of neighboring cities becomes
110
more influential in determining city size. This can be seen in figure 28(c), where transport cost
is raised to 1.1 units. Take industry 8 again. The most productive city (6; 8) is still in the picture
but production is more intense in the less productive city (17; 8) when transport cost is raised.
City (6; 8) is quite productive in isolation, but is surrounded by cities whose productivity is not
exceptional. Consequently, its local market is small. On the other hand, city (17; 8) is surrounded
by productive cities. Since utility is concave, there is large demand for commodity 8 from these
productive (and therefore, populous) neighbors. And this large demand will be fulfilled by the
nearby city (17; 8) rather than a faraway city (6; 8) to ward off the increased shipping charge.
City (17; 8) grows to support local demand that, in turn, will create a large demand for goods
other than 8 produced by its neighbors. As a result, high transportation cost creates snowballing
clusters of cities, whose average productivity across the industries within the region is high, and
eliminates cities of high productivity in geographic isolation. The equilibrium does not simply
select the most productive cities as survivors.
The various theories we have summarized have zero transport costs. The simulations indicate
that positive transport costs can generate a new force in city selection, namely a kind of local
market effect illustrated in figure 28(c).
Figure 29 and table 12 summarize maximum likelihood estimation for the lognormal and
GEV city size distributions from these simulations. On the whole, both distributions fit the
simulations well. Notice that the number of active cities is not monotonically increasing in
transport cost. The reason is that some clusters of cities empty out as transport cost increases.
Table 12 reports the estimated parameters. The last four columns are the values of the log
likelihood function (larger is better), Akaike and Bayesian Information Criteria (AIC and BIC),
and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) statistic (smaller is better for all). Judging by the values of the
KS statistic, the overall fit is not bad. Turning next to the comparison between the lognormal and
GEV distributions, the simulated city size distributions yield better log likelihood values for GEV
when transport cost is small but favor lognormal for AIC and BIC (GEV has more parameters).
In the end, the fits are almost identical. In additional simulations not detailed here, we found
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Figure 29. Maximum likelihood estimation with iceberg transportation parameter (from top row) 1.01,
1.02, 1.05 and 1.1. Transportation becomes costlier in this order.
no systematic relationship between transportation cost and how well either distribution fits the
data.
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 2.3.1
Proof. Note that s(ai) is monotone decreasing in ai. Suppose J > 2 and the network is neither
complete or completely isolated. We have
s0(ai) :=
ds(ai)
dai
=  (log )s(ai)S 1(S   si)  0
with equality iff  = 1. The second derivative is, therefore,
d2s(ai)
da2i
= [s0(ai)]2
S   2si
si(S   si)  0;
with equality iff  = 1. Hence s(ai) is strictly convex in ai.
To show that s(ai) bulges as  grows, first note
@s(ai)
@ =   1s(ai)(ai AB 1), where A :=
P
j a j
 a j
and B :=
P
j 
 a j . Then
dD()
d
=
1
2
n
[s(aM)   s(aH)](aH   AB 1) + [s(aM)   s(aL)](aL   AB 1)
o
;
where aM := (aH+aL)=2. The first term in the curly braces is positive because s(aM)  s(aH) > 0 and
aH AB 1 = B 1P j,H(aH a j) a j > 0. Likewise, the second term is positive because s(aM) s(aL) < 0
and aL   AB 1 < 0. Therefore dD()d > 0, which establishes the claim. 
A.4 Idea behind Geodesic Length (16)
We briefly repeat [HSF+05]’s arguments to obtain (16) in our context. Consider a geodesic be-
tween nodes vi and v j. We ignore loops. The probability that a child node traces back to its
ancestors via some circumvention is proportional to 1=J. It becomes negligible as the system size
J grows (our system size ranges from 69 to 25,358 in section 2.4). As shown in [HSF+05], the re-
sulting error is minimal. A tree is a sequence of nodes where each node except for the root node
has exactly one parent (or ancestor) node. Each node may or may not be followed by (a) child
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node(s). There are no cycles on a tree. If we pick a random tree starting from vi, we will wind
up at v j somewhere along the tree k j=
P
r2V kr of the time and we will not reach vi the remaining
1   k j=Pr kr of the time. On average, we will reach v j within Pr kr=k j trials. Suppose that the
depth (the number of parent nodes that you have to go through before reaching your root node)
of v j is l. There are kil 1 nodes whose depth is l. Therefore, on average, we arrive at v j in l steps
if P
r kr
k j
= kil 1; (50)
from which we obtain (16). In other words, if, on average, it takes more than kil 1 trials to reach
city j, i.e.,
P
r kr
k j
> kil 1, then it is likely that city j is more than l steps away from your city i. You
would try kil 1 times to find city j, when in fact you would need additional
P
r kr
k j
  kil 1 trials
to reach city j, meaning that city j is not in the group of cities l steps away from you but actually
located somewhere farther down. On the contrary if it takes less than kil 1 trials to reach city
j, then city j should be less than l steps away from you. You would not need that many trials to
find a city j, the implication being that, once again, you are looking at a wrong group of cities.
Thus, city i and j are l steps apart from each other exactly when (50) is satisfied with equality.
A.5 Branching Factor
Take a random edge and walk towards one arbitrarily selected end. Call where you arrived at
a neighboring node. The average degree of neighboring nodes thus reached approximates the
mean branching factor . In effect, we will take one degree off the average degree found above
because the edge we just walked on cannot be used to reach the destination city. We are climbing
up a tree, not down (recall how goods find their destination city in section 2.3.6). Also note that
the mean branching factor is not just a mean degree hki. We are not hopping from one city to
another but climbing a tree from one neighbor to next to reach the destination city. Thus, a city
charged with lots of links is more likely to be a neighbor of some city than a poorly connected
city, and cities are duly weighted when fed into the mean branching factor. In other words,
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Houston is rare while there are quite a few mid-sized cities but that does not mean Houston is
hard to reach at random for its rarity. Houston has far more edges than mid-sized cities and we
are likely to travel through Houston at some point or another (cf. figure 7(a)). In particular a node
of degree k has a chance proportional to k1(k) of being at one end of an arbitrary direction on a
randomly chosen edge, where 1(k) is a probability density function of (21). Or put differently, if
we parachute into a random edge and then flip a coin to decide which direction to go in, we will
arrive at a k-th degree city k1(k) out of
PJ
x=1 x1(x) times. Thus, the mean branching factor is given
by (22).
A.6 Maximum Spacing Estimation
It might be easier to make sense of the use of geometric mean in MSE if we recast it as an
analogue of a more familiar, linear regression. The geometric mean of steps here corresponds
to ordinary least squares and the arithmetic mean corresponds to a plain sum of residuals. Say
we are trying to regress 2 = ( 1; 0; 1) on x = ( 1; 0; 1). If we aim to minimize the sum of
residuals, any real estimate that makes the regression line run through the origin (0; 0) will work,
just as much as any estimate will make the arithmetic mean of gaps 1=J. We will end up with
infinitely many estimates because residual at x = 1 always offsets the one at x =  1. To ward
off this cancellation problem, we usually try to minimize the sum of squared residuals, which
leads to a unique estimate, a 45-degree line. Similarly, the use of geometric mean will solve the
indeterminacy problem that comes with arithmetic mean and will promise us sensible estimates.
The geometric mean also comes in handy here. The gap tends to get tighter near the top
and/or the bottom of most distributions as the CDF creeps up to one and/or bears down on
zero. However, this does not mean New York or New Amsterdam, IN counts less than other
cities as a sample. The geometric mean offsets this general tendency and duly stretches small
gaps so that these extremities will receive no less attention than the ones in the middle. There is
no particular reason to let the mid-sized cities punch above their weight.
On a related matter, we report Kolomogorov-Smirnov (KS) statistic. MSE is similar to KS in
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that both KS and the maximand of MSE are a power mean. KS statistic is a power mean of the
form 8>><>>:1J X
i
jEmpirical F(si)   F(si)jp
9>>=>>;
1
p
(51)
with p!1 (i.e., the maximum of the residuals, the L1 norm), whereas the maximand of MSE is
a power mean of the form 8>><>>:1J X
i
(F(si)   F(si 1))p
9>>=>>;
1
p
(52)
with p ! 0 (i.e., the geometric mean of the gaps). The way they aggregate the data is where
their difference comes in. KS statistic only picks up a single city where the predicted value
deviates from the actual value the most. It does not tell us anything about the selected model’s
performance over the remainder of cities other than the fact that their gap is tighter than the
KS value (but not by how far). On the other hand, the maximand of MSE is determined by the
step gap log-averaged over the entire range of the cities, and probably a better measuring tool to
gauge the model’s performance in that respect.
To get a sense of what MSE hunts for, consider what happens if we pull out the estimate
that minimizes the geometric mean instead. Minimum spacing estimator would dump the entire
interval [0; 1] on one particular city i (any city will do) so that F(s j;) = 0 for all j < i and F(s j;) =
1 for all j  i, in which case, the geometric mean would be zero, the smallest value possible
(practically the same result when you try to maximize the arithmetic mean as we mentioned
above, in the sense that any estimate will be as good as any other). This would make such a
pointless estimator. MSE does the exact opposite.
A.7 Analysis of Variance
Figures 30 and 31 present the kernel estimate of GMP growth rate. Aside from an increase in
variance in the lower mid range and decrease in the mid range, there does not seem to be a
systematic correlation between GMP and its variance in growth rate.
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Figure 30.
A.8 Unconditional Scale Economies
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Figure 31. Kernel Estimate of Variance
To further understand the reasoning behind
proposition 3.3.2, conduct comparative statics
on  . Imagine that  goes down (or equiv-
alently,  goes up). In intracity equilibrium
in Pi, Bi

Si

can take any value. In inter-
city equilibrium in P, Bi

Si

is subject to util-
ity equalization condition (43). As the expen-
diture share of housing  decreases, we can
pack lots of people in a city (because they do
not care about the lot size much) and produce
lots of composite goods (which they do care
about). The story would have ended here in Pi, but in P, it goes further. This large size makes
the city appealing because the marginal rate of substitution of composite goods measured in
terms of lot size is getting larger, and people are willing to swap a large parcel of land for only
a few composite goods to squeeze Axel in. We still have utility equalization requirement (29) to
meet, but people view a large city with small houses more favorably than a small city with large
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houses. To offset the rush of people into a large city, the effective wage rate (41) in a city goes
down in equilibrium according to (29) (otherwise, utility level in a large city would exceed small
city’s). Pi does not have this autocorrecting mechanism, with which the city steers its population
to an increasing returns to scale level. The city size is exogenous in Pi and Pi does not factor
in the levelling effect of the wage across the cities, but P does. And because of the existence of
the housing market, we do not specifically require 

Si

to be nonnegative in P. Notice that as 
becomes smaller, scale economies also weaken because the residents do not care about housing,
and the residents become more willing to scoot over to make room for Axel, even when he does
not raise citywide productivity much for the land they have to give up for him. Housing market
is indispensable in this sense to observe endogenously induced agglomeration economies in P.
This observation compares to a closed and open monocentric city model (cf. Brueckner [Bru87]).
In a closed monocentric city, size is exogenous but utility level is endogenous just as in Pi. In an
open monocentric city, size is endogenous but utility level has to match the national level as in
P. Since the wage rate depends on city size, P picks the levelling effect of wage but Pi does not,
and therefore, we have to throw in an additional assumption for Pi.
A.9 The City-Size Distribution and Gibrat’s Law
Denote discrete time by subscript t and define 

Sit

B a+

Sit

a 

Sit
 
Sit
 
 and suppose ()
is invertible in the neighborhood of equilibrium Si. Then Ait

Sit

= K from (43) so that Sit =
 1(K=Ait). With the law of motion A
i
t = (1 + 
i
t)A
i
t 1, we have
Sit = (1 + 
i
t)S
i
t 1; (53)
where 1 + it B 1=
 1(1 + it). Then
d logSit
dt
 it;
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for a small , leading to the Gibrat’s law. Computing the city size recursively, (53) also implies
log Sit  log Si0 +
tX
=1
it;
which leads to the lognormal city-size distribution as t ! 1 by the central limit theorem. See
[Eec04] for details.
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